The Nut-Rage Case: A Legitimacy Challenge Against Korean Air

Master’s Thesis
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Abstract

The importance of legitimacy, in both academic and business contexts, has been growing gradually, as stakeholders focus less on just the goods and services they purchase; legitimacy becomes standalone selling factor to many individuals, which numerous organizations including multinational corporation cannot ignore.

This thesis paper aims to comprehend the complex process of legitimacy defense involving multi-stakeholders, with contributions to the existing organization studies on legitimacy by researching how the media challenges and delegitimizes defensive corporate accounts deployed to control public sentiment. The primary objective of this thesis paper is to identify the delegitimization strategies employed by the Korean media to challenge Korean Air’s countermeasures after the nut-rage incident that occurred on 5th December 2014.

Based on previous research conducted, notably that of van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and Vaara et al. (2006), categorization and analysis of Korean media articles, and corporate defensive accounts was conducted. Then critical discourse analysis (CDA) was adopted a key analysis tool, for developing an understanding of the delegitimization process. Using these two strategies, the strategic media texts and the subsequent corporate defensive accounts were categorized into four sensemaking strategies: authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation and normalization (mythopoesis was exempted).

An insight into the process of delegitimization is shown by the findings of this paper, indicating that normative legitimacy challenges were most prevalent, with a small proportion of pragmatic challenges however no cognitive legitimacy challenges were identified. The causes behind the distribution of these legitimacy challenges is then discussed in-depth. Why Korean Air’s countermeasures yielded outcomes which were far beyond what would have originally been expected is also discussed.

Although the contextual background of this paper is rather unique, it is still able to provide practical outcomes for future research and organizational process. It sheds light on the unique forms of multinational corporations (MNCs) within Korea: Chaebol, and how their existence affects corporate culture and associated legitimacy challenges. The importance of the media is also highlighted, as their contribution in conducting legitimacy challenges is significant.

Keywords : (Organizational) Delegitimization, Chaebol, Korea, media, communication, critical discourse analysis (CDA), corporate culture
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1 Introduction

Similarly addressed in Lars Thøger Christensen and Joep Cornelissen (2011)’s paper, there is a “continuous and growing” interest in the study of corporate communication by scholars of different academic background: management and organization theory, public relations, and so on. As one of the branches of corporate communication, a study of legitimacy and corporate culture are given a notable share of such interest as well. Despite being an “age-old issue”, the study of legitimacy still remains remarkable, playing central role in “influential social theories” and “institutional organizational analysis” (Thøger Christensen & Cornelissen, 2011). Van Der Aart (2015) has claimed, “The theory of legitimacy states that individuals and organizations are more willing to share their resources with an organization that has a high legitimacy” (pg.3). Along with recent years’ growing interest of the legitimacy as scholarly topic, his words imply that legitimacy indeed is believed to be an important aspect for various organizations (by that corporates are of no exception) and their social interactions. Its academic and business importance would be more viable for further scholarly investigation when combined with the study of corporate culture – it may act as a key that explains how corporate culture is formed and altered as a need for change arises.

As the focus of this paper will be about Korean media’s challenge toward legitimation strategies of Korean Air, which is one of “Chaebols” within Korea, it would indeed be a necessary to review the concept of Chaebol. Originated from a Japanese term: Zaibatsu [財閥(ざいばつ)]¹, Chaebol (재벌/財閥) is now better represented as a Korean term to describe conglomerates specific to those that are created and currently operate within Korea. Chaebol has very significant influence in Korea over number of matters (Cho et al, 2014):

1. initial and continutive economic growth and development within Korea;
2. formation of Korean corporate culture;
3. “growing public and political backlash against what are seen as overly powerful institutions” (p.1)

The second and the third points deserves attention to be studied on, especially as a key to understand recent legitimacy challenge occurring in the Korean economy. With ideas adopted

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¹ Ironically, Zaibatsu technically no longer exist, for a historical reason: disbanded by GHQ post WW2. However it turned later into ‘Keiretsu,’ which is elaborated later on.
has defined corporate culture as “psychological sub-system that employees share”; this includes “beliefs, values or behavioral norms within an organization” (p.2). Chaebols’ strong economic performance has eventually contributed significant amount in formation of Korean corporate culture: “unique and strong corporate culture” (p.2). Such corporate culture is deemed to be a product of a unique combination of two important concepts: collectivism\(^2\) and progressivism\(^3\), which formed ‘dynamic collectivism’ (Cho & Yoon, 2001). The reckoned-to-be-positive aftermaths of formation of such corporate culture include (Cho et al., 2014):

1. emphasis on strong cohesiveness among employees.
2. “pursue fast alteration in response to changes of environment and prepare for the future with optimism, thus producing the common ‘hurry up, hurry up’ or ‘can-do’ spirit” (Cho et al., 2014).

Cho and Yoon (2001) further elaborates on unique features of Korean corporate culture that it fosters fierce competition, eventually spreading it to society in general as well. Even though this unique corporate culture initially started off from a concept of traditional collectivism, its idea stayed only within its internal members; it created and reinforced boundary against those who are not admitted as part of the group (Chaebol).

Interestingly however, Korean corporate culture that Chaebols have formed so far – the one that Cho et al. (2014) have argued it to be “deeply ingrained and slow moving” – is progressively facing legitimacy challenge; what was accepted back then is now being questioned, denied and challenged. Along with time change and enormous economic growth and development, change in generation led to occurrence of notable social shifts; corporate culture also face consequential need to cope with this change (Cho et al., 2014). Contrary to what corporate culture within Korea was originally aimed, many individuals nowadays view the corporate culture of Korean society in general to be very oppressive, especially under

\(^2\) Collectivism defined as a political theory that the people should own the means of production; he idea that people should prioritize the good of society over the welfare of the individual (collectivism, n.d.)

\(^3\) Progressivism has been defined as “the propensity to: pursue fast alteration in response to changes of environment and prepare for the future with optimism, thus producing the common ‘hurry up, hurry up’ or ‘can-do’ spirit” (Cho et al., 2014).
Desiring a greater economic democracy and organizational justice, the younger generation of Korean society has found current corporate culture frustrating, naming it as “abusing culture” [Hangul\(^5\):갑질 문화 / Revised Romanization of Korean (hereafter RR): ‘Gap-zil Munhua’]. Although it is on the premise that definition of economic democracy needs to be more clearly defined, Kristel Van der Elst and Sushant Palakurthi Rao\(^6\), in their 2013 article, have emphasized such phenomena, stating:

“(To have any impact on Korea’s rising income inequality and slowing growth rates) the public has called for action and politicians have responded with pledges for “economic democracy” – a catch-all slogan for reform.”

While the “background ‘stereotypic’ characteristics of corporate culture at Chaebol group level still have a strong influence” on individuals (Cho et al., 2014; p.8) – that is, unique and distinguishable cultural characteristics of each Chaebol formed from the founder still remain, alluding that convergence (of corporate culture) suggested by Rowley (2013) does not seem to prevail – this has resulted in emergence of new aspect (perhaps a different direction) of employee’s value orientation; videlicet, greater degree of individualism and decline in positive-oriented mind, which has been an important aspect of dynamic collectivism of Chaebol corporate culture.

Observing many ridiculous cases of illegitimate corporate behaviors and communication failures against its stakeholders: mainly, workforce, it was not too long that I as well started to fear and expect working in my home country may not be as pleasant as I have previously thought of. As the circumstances of Korean companies seem to somewhat appear contrary to what Van Der Aart has claimed, however, a key question remains to be answered: do

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\(^4\) Topic of Chaebols will also be further elaborated in literature review section

\(^5\) Not the direct translation, but closest I can get considering its Hangul (Korean character) context.

\(^6\) Hangul is a Korean term describing Korean as a written language.

\(^7\) This is regarded as a slang; this is a combination of a word “갑(甲) – the one in superior position” and “질 – (slang term for) an act of performing (whatever word added in front)”.

\(^8\) Director and Head of Strategic Foresight at the World Economic Forum and Senior Director and Head of Asia at the World Economic Forum

\(^9\) “In general terms, economic democracy seems to mean a restructuring from export-led to domestic, demand-driven growth with greater opportunities for small and medium businesses to flourish” (Van der Elst and Rao, 2013).
companies, particularly Chaebols within Korea, invests perfunctory amount of effort and resources to obtain legitimacy when especially challenge toward the owner family members is involved, whether their images matter significantly to their business or not? The main focus of this paper, what so called the Korean Air case, is one prime example of such case. For those who may not be familiar with this corporate, Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. (Hangul: 대한항공; RR: Daehan Hanggong) is the biggest airline in South Korea, in terms of fleet size, international destinations and international flights. The case for this paper, known widely known as “the nut-rage case\(^{10}\),” is a Korean Air’s failure on legitimacy defense and crisis management, specifically in its attempt to communicate and convince its desired legitimation to its various stakeholders after normally unacceptable behavior by ex-vice president Cho Hyun-ah (Heather Cho).

1.1 Research goals and objectives

The overall goal of this paper is to view organizational legitimacy in relation to corporate culture - how they in particular can interact or threaten each other. Specifically, the central aim is to investigate how the actions of an organization are discursively legitimatized/de-legimatized in the media. The role of media was notable in this particular case; without media’s fierce pursuit of the case and questioning of legitimacy, the case could have been silently buried.

The main central research question, therefore, is:

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\text{What delegitimization strategies were used in the media to question Korean Air’s countermeasures in the nut-rage incident?}
\]

1.2 Structure of the thesis

Structure wise, this paper consists of 6 sections. The first section of the paper: introduction provides motivation of the author to write this paper, essential contexts and research question. Theoretical framework, as the second section, narrates associated literatures for this paper. The literature review discusses the notion of legitimacy, and its sub-categories that will be

\(^{10}\) The case’s full name is often referred as “an incident of Korean Air Flight number KE 086 take-off delay (대한항공 KE 086 편 이륙지연 사건).”

\(^{11}\) Some Korean media prefer calling it ‘the nut-return’ (땅콩회항) incident; in this paper, the nut-rage will be used instead however, as it is more familiar term internationally.
considered in this paper. It also addresses the notion of ‘Chaebol,’ which is another central element of this paper. Then, data and methodology are introduced. This section starts off by offering short summary of the ‘nut-rage’ incident, which is the starting point of the delegitimization warfare. Then, the Korean Air’s countermeasures: official and ulterior actions regarding the case are mentioned. In the second subsection of methodology, data to be collected is mentioned: the strategic media text as the main data, and defensive corporate accounts as complementary data. The section is then concluded by elaborating on critical discourse analysis on legitimacy to be used for the paper, which categorizes into five models. Based on these, the section four contains findings of the research. Information presented in the findings are further developed in the discussion section. Last, the contribution and conclusion of the study is presented. After academic and pragmatic implications are discussed, limitation of the study and suggestion for the future research are given as well.
2 Theoretical framework

2.1 (Organizational) Legitimacy

Prior to other notable literatures that cover legitimacy in various areas, I would like to start with works from J.B. Dowling and J. Pfeffer\textsuperscript{12} and by Mark C. Suchman\textsuperscript{13}. Based on their foundational research works claiming (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975):

1. organizational legitimacy reflects a congruence between social system norms
2. social values are associated with or implied by an organization’s activities

it can be stated that legitimacy acts as necessary asset that assists an organization to sustain the flow of resources from its operating environment, citing Hannan & Freeman (1989) that Suchman cited. Scott et al (2000) further elaborate on such claim, insisting that organizations require more than mere material resources and technical information, in order to “survive and thrive in their social environments” (Patel et al, 2005). Taking the these in mind, organizational legitimacy could be identified as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Meyer and Scott offer a different approach to the definition of the term, claiming that ‘organizational legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an organization - the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provide explanations for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction …’ (Meyer and Scott, 1983: 201).

An organization’s actions, goals and many other components are judged by its environmental actors / stakeholders, letting them to confer or withdraw legitimacy to/from an organization. Culture, norms, rules and laws are notable set of accepted standards that Scott et al (2000) suggests. Along with these standards, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) viewed that the legitimacy within an organization can be formed in three ways. First is via conforming to existing social norms; second involves altering social norms and third deals “becom[ing] identified with symbols, values, or institutions which have a strong base of social legitimacy” (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975. p.127). They have added a note, suggesting that communication is a tool that directs the latter two strategies. It should also be noted, however, that the changing of social

\textsuperscript{12} Organizational legitimacy: Social values and organizational behavior

\textsuperscript{13} Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches
norms and values is very challenging, as they are the motivating factors of organizational change and source of pressure for organizational legitimation; that is to say, many organizations tend to choose the first or the third option (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975, p. 125).

It is interesting to think that social action, as stated by political economist Max Weber in 1968, is guided by legitimate order. In line with this argument, business organization, whether public or private, is required to be concerned about social expectations of its participating area, in order to achieve its aims. Parsons (1960) supports such idea as well, arguing that organizations that pursue goals in line with social values have a legitimate claim on resources.

It seems, through various cases of organizations worldwide, an understanding of organizational legitimacy is a key to elaborate on how they (should) adjust to the changing environment and potential crises. Suchman (1995) has emphasized legitimacy is a key element that enhances an organization’s stability, while D’Aunno and Zuckerman (1987) suggests it ensures organizational survivability, and Barnett (1997) mentions it as a mean of securing organizational viability. By doing so, legitimate organizations are accepted, valued and taken for granted as right, fitting and good (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Meyer and Scott, 1983). Maintaining legitimacy thus is often routinized into organizational activity, according to Ashforth and Gibbs (1990).

Addressed in Patel et al. (2005)’s paper, “a third wave of interest in legitimacy was based on cognitive belief systems” (p.4). That is, cognitive belief of stakeholders is another interesting reason why an importance of organizational legitimacy rises. Stakeholders relevant to an organization examine and judge it based on its adherence to social norms – this could be both local and global. This may contain but not limited to cultural models, appropriate structural or procedural regulations, and so on (Lounsubury & Glynn, 2001; Ruef & Scott, 1998).

Before moving onto explaining types of legitimacy, an interesting literature review was done by Niina Erkama and Eero Vaara, and it has notable relevance to this paper. In their literature review, they have noted that several scholars of communication areas – Ashforth and Gibbs, Arndt and Bigelow and so on – found how impression management is a central part of legitimation. A key to the impression management highlights a role of discourse, as it is deemed crucial to legitimization of institution and institutional change (Phillips et al., 2004). Citing Elsbach, Sutton, Brown and Jones, Erkama and Vaara, according to such perspective it is claimed that “the management of legitimacy often involves targeted and even manipulative
rhetoric aimed at presenting issues in a way that promotes the interests and protects the power position of specific actors.” They have further added a note that “one essential finding of this research is that a successful framing requires that the audience can link the message to other discourses and identify with the key concepts and arguments” (Erkama and Vaara, 2010).

Discourse, based on Fairclough (2003)’s point, can be illustrated as “linguistically mediated representation of the world” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008), playing a crucial role in MNCs. While knowledge of legitimacy in the field of management and organization seems fairly adequate, as Suchman (1995) would say, many scholars like Philips et al (2004) and Suddaby & Greenwood (2005) may argue that discursive aspects of legitimation have remained rather underexplored. In particular, MNC research has been facing this issue, as scholars in the field have given relatively less attention to the topic of discursive legitimation processes and practices (Geppert, 2003; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).

As specifically addressed in van Dijk’s 1997 paper, adopting discursive approach for social research – organization and management studies as well –has been gradually increasing (Boje, Oswick, & Ford, 2004; Grant, Hardy, Oswick, & Putnam, 2004; Parker, 1992). To develop this research area further, Fairclough (2003) particularly argues that discourses should ideally be analyzed simultaneously at three levels:

- text (micro-level textual elements)
- discursive practice (the production and interpretation of texts)
- social practice (the situational and institutional context)

From a discursive perspective, it is necessary to take the notion that senses of legitimacy are created in relation to specific discourses. Videlicet, think of discourses as the “frames” provider that offers an understanding of particular issues to people (Fairclough, 1989, 1992; Fiss & Hirsch, 2005). For the involved stakeholders, these “frames” have significant relevance; for an instance, existence of particular available discourses may determine or influence how certain individuals make of and give sense to particular actions. This also indicates, however, that actors can intentionally position themselves in a better position by positioning themselves “vis-a-vis specific discourses” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; p.4) or mobilizing particular discourses (Hardy et al., 2000; Rojo & van Dijk, 1997).

2.2 Types of legitimacy
Legitimacy in specific can be elaborated into three types according to Suchman (1995) and Scott et al (2000): normative (moral), pragmatic, and cognitive legitimacy. Each of these categories employ a different standard to evaluate legitimacy of an organization; moral legitimacy reflecting a positive normative evaluation of an organization and its activities could be one possible example of this case (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).

This specification of legitimacy models allows us to view how an organization and its environment(s) interact; whether an organization is legitimate or not is driven from “using all or a combination of these elements” (Patel et al, 2005; Ruef and Scott, 1998). While it would be favorable to achieve greater degree/number of legitimacy, it is quite challenging for an organization to attempting to meet its deemed-success level target of all three types of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), some possibly due to conflicting interest of each legitimacy depending on nature of its operation, and so on.

2.2.1 Normative (moral) legitimacy:

To start with, an organization gains normative (or moral) legitimacy, when it conducts and reflects socially acceptable/desirable norms, standards and values. Simplistically speaking, moral legitimacy depends on societal perspective judging an organization’s action to be morally acceptable. That is, moral legitimacy is threatened if the constituency of an organization perceives the organization’s actions are breaching political or perhaps economic agreements or system, especially for immoral reasons (Yankelovich, 1974).

A notable aspect of this legitimacy is that constituencies of an organization assess it in terms of its social correctness and desirability, not whether the constituencies themselves derive benefits from it (Patel et al, 2005). To further elaborate this model of legitimacy, Suchman (1995: 579-582) identifies four variants of normative legitimacy in the literature:

1) Judgements about outputs and consequences (consequential legitimacy);
2) Evaluations of procedures and techniques (procedural legitimacy);
3) Assessments of categories and structures (structural legitimacy);
4) Evaluations of leaders and personnel (personal legitimacy).

14 Different authors seem to use normative and moral legitimacy interchangeably.
15 Scott et al however focused this more on institutional aspect, considering nature of his work
The first component of normative legitimacy focuses on judging an organization against criteria and output measures specific to the type of organization. That is to say that consequential legitimacy relates to what an organization has accomplished based on criteria that is specific to that organization (Suchman, 1995; Heidhues et al, 2012; Brinkerhoff, 2005). Example of measuring consequential legitimacy can be, for an instance, patient mortality rates for hospitals, grade point average (GPA) or student graduation rates for schools, and more on. This suggests that organizations with tangible and measurable outputs may find this legitimacy relatively easier to achieve, whereas those with outputs that are subject to an argument or difficult to quantify may face contest (Brinkerhoff, 2005).

Brinkerhoff (2005) has mentioned that while the first part of the normative legitimacy as “doing the right things,” procedural legitimacy can be interpreted as “doing things right” (p.8). It is indeed important for an organization to achieve economically and socially desired and valued results but it is not the only method of gaining normative legitimacy. Hence as the name ‘procedural’ legitimacy suggests, conducting “societally valued, validated and/or mandated practices and procedures” to garner legitimacy is equally significant (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Health, education, and social welfare sectors are the notable cases in a point, in which procedural legitimacy is formalized in regulatory oversight accreditation, and licensure.

Structural legitimacy is fairly straightforward as well; it is granted to an organization when its constituencies view its structural characteristics are fair and legit to perform its tasks. Brinkerhoff offers an example of social service organization to explain the concept of structural legitimacy. Social service organizations are mostly non-profit, voluntary organization. This point validates them to belong in a “category of organizations recognized for pursuit of socially beneficial objectives, rather than for any specific results it has achieved” (p.8).

Last but not least, personal legitimacy is derived from organizational leaders and staff personnel’s reputation, personal status and charisma (Suchman, 1995; Heidhues et al, 2012; Brinkerhoff, 2005). To wit, an organization garners personal legitimacy not due to its accomplishment or aims, but via how its constituencies view the legitimacy of organization’s titular head or representative.

2.2.2 Pragmatic legitimacy:
While consequential legitimacy from normative legitimacy is concerned with how and what an organization has accomplished based on criteria that is specific to that organization, pragmatic legitimacy may take similar but different approach; it relates to the instrumental value of the organization for its stakeholders, in terms of how it fulfills their self-interest. The organization’s constituency therefore scrutinizes actions and behaviors taken by the organization, in order to determine their effects on self-interest of the constituency.

Like how it is done in normative legitimacy, pragmatic legitimacy is further broken down into three sub-sections:

1) Exchange legitimacy;
2) Influence legitimacy;
3) Dispositional legitimacy.

First of all, Suchman (1995) defines exchange legitimacy as constituents / stakeholders’ support for organizational policies as they benefit from those. Borrowing a phrase from Van der Aart (2015), it is “legitimacy in exchange for what you get from that organization” (p.9).

Not all constituency are concerned about direct benefit that they will receive from an organization that they support, however. Some may show their support because they believe the organization they support is capable and is responsible to handle their larger interests; in such case, they accord influence legitimacy to the organization (Suchman, 1995). Support for environmental NGO could be one supporting case of this type of legitimacy. Their work may not directly fulfill self-interest of their constituents, but the constituents still offer their support to see their greater interest to be achieved: change in regulatory outcome, such as legislation of pro-environmental policies, and so on (Brinkerhoff, 2005).

Influence legitimacy can be, as suggested by Blinkerhoff (2005), quite important for an organization with intangible or hard-to-measure outputs, as it often faces a need to assure its constituents and stakeholders in some way as well. In their effort to build influence legitimacy, some employ and incorporate some form of stakeholder participation, to assure the stakeholders to witness organizational effort to demonstrate its effort and responsiveness to the stakeholder/constituents’ demand and feedback.

The third type of pragmatic legitimacy is dispositional legitimacy. When stakeholders / constituents of an organization support it due to the good attributes that they believe the organization obtain. Although organizations are not human and thus do not have
personalities, individuals tend to personify organizations, characterizing them as being autonomous and attributing human characteristics, such as trustworthy, decent, or wise (Heidhues et al., 2012; Van der Aart, 2015).

2.2.3 Cognitive legitimacy:

Cognitive legitimacy is created when an organization pursues goals that society deems to be proper and desirable. It differs from the above two legitimacies however, as it is not attributed based on the evaluation of organization and/or organizational action; videlicet, cognitive legitimacy does not deal with a form of evaluation (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Van der Aart, 2015). To explain its existence, Suchman (1995) has mentioned two sources of cognitive legitimacy:

1) Comprehensibility
2) Taken-for-grantedness

Van der Aart (2015) has further elaborated on these two, explaining how they support rationale of cognitive legitimacy. Comprehensibility is associated with an organization’s stakeholders / constituents’ cultural model; specifically, whether they, within their cultural framework, can explain reasons behind its existence and its actions. Videlicet, failure to do so will grant low cognitive legitimacy based on comprehensibility. The second aspect of cognitive legitimacy: taken-for-grantedness acts complementary reason for the former aspect. Here the question is, whether an organization’s stakeholders/constituents can think of any possible alternative that can substitute its existence. If they cannot do so, constituency support for the organization is not due to self-interest, but “rather due to its taken-for-granted character” (Chaison, 2002; p.10). They will accept its existence as an inevitable fact and move on.

2.3 “Chaebol” (The Korean Conglomerate) and corporate culture change in Korea:

Understanding a historical background of the Chaebol-centered economy that has been prevalent in Korea so far would be necessary to understand this case. The Japanese Colonial Period (1910 – 1945) and the Korean War (1950 – 1953) resulted in the destruction of opportunities to obtain capital stock, technologies and accessible natural resources needed for the Korean economy (Haggard, Kang and Moon, 1997). The exportation strategy implemented by the Korean government was deemed to be an adequate sole solution to obtain foreign currency, which is mandatory to purchase the resources needed for an economic growth and development, such as natural resources, industrial goods, and so on.
The state focusing on the export-oriented economy encouraged the formation of Chaebols (Lee, Clacher and Keasey, 2012).

Unique characteristics of Chaebols informs us that Chaebols are (Chaebol, n.d.):

1) are large family-owned business conglomerate in many unrelated industries
2) tend to be global multinational own numerous international enterprises
3) are controlled by a chairman with power over all the operations

While the second aspect may not be unique when compared to conglomerate, trust, Konzern, and so on, it is the first and the third aspects that are truly notable, as they are by-product of economic policy deployed by Korean government in 1960s and onward. Chaebol emerged by establishing affiliates at several different tiers or cross-ownership among affiliates (Lee and Jin, 2009). It is assumed that contemporary Korean government viewed that business distribution channels were too fragmented, and there was a need to develop a strong business organization to “organize others in an efficient manner” (Jun and Rowley, 2014).

Visvabharathy (1984) suggested, from distributional channel theory perspective, that “trading companies have considerable potential to increase the efficiency of export and import channels in developing countries.”

As the government realized a need to create such organizations, it decided to establish a business model based on the Japanese GTC (JGTC) model to expand exports worldwide and achieve economic internationalization” (Jun and Rowley, 2014). Therefore it is undeniable that Chaebols, with preferential treatment from Korean government, emerged and were developed initially similar to structural model of Keitetsu (Japanese conglomerates) consisting of a main bank, a large trading company and a manufacturer. Majority of Chaebols hence set a big trading company as their main engine for their group as well.

Jun and Rowley (2014) offered an example of Samsung, the biggest Chaebol of Korea to elaborate on its structure. To diversify its business while maintaining scale, Samsung Group forms a tight relationship between a trading company (GTC; Samsung Corporation), a manufacturing company (Samsung Heavy Industries), a mobile company (Samsung Electronics), an insurance & finance firm (Samsung Life Insurance) and so on. A notable point to focus is that Samsung Corporation as the trading company, placed “at the heart of Chaebols,” carried out substantial role in fostering and facilitating both international trade worldwide and internal development of Samsung group as a whole (Jun and Rowley, 2014).
Chaebols have played significant roles in Korean economic growth and development history, as they were the main pillars of the post 1960s government project series: the state-led ‘Five Year Economic Plan’ (Jung, 2004). That is to say, they eventually ended up having gigantic share of national output (GDP). In the data set that Cho et al (2014) presented, for an instance, the total sales volumes of the four largest Chaebols – Samsung, Hyundai Motors Company (hereafter HMC), SK and LG – accounted about 50% of Korean GDP (Hankyoreh 2012), 17.9%, 10.6%, 9.5% and 9.1% respectively. In addition, from 1995 to 2011, it is notable to observe that Samsung’s sales rose about 40 times, while HMC’s 22 times and SK’s 27 times, respectively as well, which along with previous percentage figures re-emphasize Chaebols’ social influence.
3 Data and Method

In this section of the paper, data sets collected, methods and measures used to answer the research question(s) are discussed. The first subsection presents the case, elaborating details of what happened during the nut-rage incident. Second subsection narrates about what data are collected and with what tool they will be analyzed for the paper, each with different reasons.

3.1 Summary of the nut-rage case

Contextual information is essential to understand the media’s delegitimization strategies questioning Korean Air’s choice to handle the incident. The following subsections describe what happened during then, and what actions Korean Air decided to take as a result.

3.1.1 The incident per se

According to the news, on 2014 December 5th Friday 0:50 AM (local time), Korean Air flight KE 086 (aircraft registration number HL7627) was about to head to Incheon International airport (IATA: ICN,) from John F. Kennedy International Airport (IATA: JFK,). Towing Car/tug Car was to perform pushback, as the flight KE 086 was ready to take-off. On this particular day, Cho Hyun-ah (Heather Cho), the ex-vice president of Korean Air was also in the plane, sitting in a first-class seat. In addition, it was reported that she was under the influence of alcohol as well.

As preflight-off checks were proceeding, one of the flight attendants offered Cho a bag of macadamia nuts as a part of flight service for first-class passengers. Hankyoreh news has reported that Cho has shouted “what kind of service is this?” at the attendant, as the attendant has asked Cho: “would you like to have macadamia nuts?” with macadamia nuts served in its wrapping paper, rather than in a bowl. According to the spokesman of Korean Air, Cho took it granted for the flight attendant to first ask her whether she wanted the nuts, and then served them on a plate, not in the bag, as per Korean Air in-flight service rules (Nam, 2014). When the flight attendant replied that her service was done according to the Korean Air manual,

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16 An airport procedure during which an aircraft is pushed backwards away from an airport gate by external power
Cho demanded the attendant to bring tablet PC which contains the manual to see whether what she has mentioned is right.

Surprised by the noise in the first-class seats and to see what is going on, cabin crew chief/chief purser Park Chang-jin was the one who brought the manual instead. Pressured by the atmosphere, as the report from Hankyoreh news mentioned, chief purser Park initially mistyped password for the tablet, which triggered further anger of ex-vice president Cho. Park, to calm Cho down, was eventually able to show official Korean Air cabin service manual through his tablet PC, disproving Cho’s accusation. The problem was not solved however; rather, it intensified as Cho’s anger was worsened. As a result, she changed aim of her reprimand from the flight attendant to chief purser Park, shouting at him to leave the plane instead (M. Kim & W. Kim. 2014). Reports from Yonhap news has also supported what Hankyoreh has reported; Yonhap news’ coverage mentioned that Cho then proceeded to severely reprimanded both the female flight attendant and the chief purser, using harsh words, loud voice and condescending tone according to the other only first-class passenger of the plane at the moment. Yonhap news quoted Ms. Park, the other first-class passenger at the time, that Cho forced both the flight attendant and cabin chief Park to sit kneeling and listen to her ruthless insults with shouting, without caring that there is a customer in the exact place. Ms. Park has specifically stated that threatening acts including searing were done in a barbaric manner that “even the passengers in economy seats could hear the noise as well” (Yoon, 2014). According to Chosun Ilbo, Cho, in her defense, claimed during the first trial that happened later after the incident that she believed Park as chief purser is responsible for the flight attendant’s ignorance of not following manual designed by Cho (Kim, 2015). As a result, he, instead of the flight attendant, was forced to be ejected from the plane, which resulted in the flight’s take-off being delayed by 46 minutes and play arrival to Incheon International Airport by 18 minutes, according to the news and Korean Air.

3.1.2 Korean Air’s official actions after the incident

On December 8th, 9:24 PM UTC+09:00, Korean Air sent an email to its accredited newsmen in order to spread its first official response: ‘statement of stance\textsuperscript{17}’\textsuperscript{18} (Kim et al. 2015).

\textsuperscript{17} Refer to appendix 1

\textsuperscript{18} The official term was not apology at the point (“입장자료”).
However, the first official response backfired rather than achieving its intended purpose, resulting in mass criticism from both intended target (general public) and communication experts. As Korean Air noticed the public sentiment worsened, contrary to their hope, Cho Yang-ho, the chairman of Korean Air and Hanjin group, decided to conduct a press conference. There he has publicly apologized what Cho, Hyun-ah did, and conducted question-and-answer session regarding the case, in his attempt to pacify growing public anger and damage to its legitimacy Translation for the apology and Q&A is attached in the appendix. Last, on 16th of December, 2014, Korean Air released its public apology, as the public sentiment continued getting worse; the statement of stance released in December 8th and the chairman Cho, Yang-ho’s public apology on 12th were deemed to be ineffective. From media’s perspective, it is inferred that Korean Air regarded this public apology advertisement as serious necessity when it realized the two previous attempts to calm public sentiment failed, and the prosecution of Korea issued confiscation warrant (J. Kim, 2014). As most media expected, however, all three reactions taken by Korean Air backfired rather than pacifying the angered public. The apology advertisement, for an instance, did not result in a way Korean Air hoped so; the major criticisms regarding this particular apology are that the problems mentioned in earlier sections still, ironically, persisted in the apology, making sincerity questionable.

3.1.3 Korean Air’s ulterior actions after the incident

Along with its official responses, Korean Air also implemented certain actions behind the curtain, which in the end caused various legitimacy challenges from both the media and its intended target of persuasion. Legally problematic one, for an instance, includes deliberate and systematic destruction of evidences. Threatening, compulsion/coercion and conciliation toward chief purser Park and the female flight attendant were also ferret out by the media and the prosecution. Seriousness of these aspects are rather self-explanatory.

In non-legal perspective, possibly from the moral point of view, Korean Air’s treatment toward the only other first-class passenger can also be mentioned. While the directly-involved employees of Korean Air: chief purser Park and the female flight attendant suffered, it is unquestionable that the other first-class passenger, whose seat was not too far from Cho’s during the incident, suffered from massive stress from unnecessary noise, argument, and terrible atmosphere as well. This eventually led her to make a complaint call to Korean Air as it failed to offer her a flight service equivalent to her payment, and thus was frustrated;
Korean Air, however, did not respond for the first two times. A board member of Korean Air called her back after 10 days since she made the complaint call, requesting her to claim that she has received a proper apology if she faces a press interview. Already frustrated with her experience, she was further enraged when the board member who called her offered Korean Air calendar and flight miniature rather than offering a proper compensation, as he was requesting her cooperation (D. Yoon, 2014). This eventually led the passenger to deny Korean Air’s request to cooperate; she revealed the case and Korean Air’s request when media contacted her, which heavily refuted and therefore damaged righteousness and legitimacy of Korean Air’s action and claims. Being the only non-Korean Air employee witness of the incident during the incident empowered the first-class passenger’s testimony; her claims demolished Korean Air’s communication strategy, further amplifying an image of liar that Korean Air acquired from the incident.

3.2 Data and procedures

To support claims to answer the research question, various communicative components, including but not limited to language aspects, of the case elaborated in section 3.1 will be analyzed. To do so will involve critical discursive analysis, which will be elaborated in the subsection 3.2.5. Moving on, this subsection of the paper introduces two different types of data that are collected. With each of them having its respective pros and cons, they are as followings:

1. Korean Air and the owner family’s official statements (press releases and public appearances)
2. Korean media’s commentary of the case

3.2.1 Korean Air and the owner family’s official statements

First of all, it would be necessary to observe and analyze what Korean Air and the official family have officially stated and how they attempted to publicly legitimize their actions and words. Most of these data are publicly available – some that are no longer available for whatever the reason shall be are found from online achieve or online media that reported them separately. I would consider these as secondary set of data, as this set of data is an original data without any bias, opinion or comment added by indirectly associated

19 These are mainly done by stakeholders (notably employees and current/potential customers)
stakeholders (e.g. media). It is thus believed that the data set illustrates how Korean Air and the owner family initially framed and/or legitimated the case – in terms of seriousness, diffusion and consequences. This data set has also heavily influenced remaining data sets of this paper – as the remaining ones are more of ‘reaction’ of this data.

3.2.2 Korean media’s commentary of the case (to be done after review)

Second set of data set involves analyzing Korean media’s commentary of the case, including analysis of both official and ulterior actions taken by Korean Air that are revealed, mentioned in the subsection 3.1.1. As detailed in table 1, 15 different articles by 12 different media were used; articles from each media are given categories based on their:

- **Type**: the article is from magazine, broadcasting company or newspaper company (online only or both online and print media)
- **Article type**: whether the article was interview, editorial or report
- **Legitimacy type**: which legitimacy did article focus on
- **Publication date**: when it was originally published

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Source</strong></th>
<th><strong>Media type</strong></th>
<th><strong>Article type</strong></th>
<th><strong>Legitimacy type</strong></th>
<th><strong>Publication date</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>Broadcasting</td>
<td>Interview, report</td>
<td>Moral Evaluation</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<td><strong>Yonhap News</strong></td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
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<td>Authorization</td>
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<td><strong>Jugan donga</strong></td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>Rationalization</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Premiumchosun</strong></td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>Authorization, Moral Evaluation</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<td><strong>Hankook Ilbo</strong></td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>Authorization</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<td><strong>MK Securities</strong></td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Normalization</td>
<td>2016</td>
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<td><strong>Business Watch</strong></td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Report</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td><strong>News1</strong></td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Authorization</td>
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<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Moral Evaluation</td>
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20 Associated with Dong-A Ilbo

21 Associated with Chosun Ilbo
This includes not only explanation and brief analysis of the case per se, but also media’s challenge of legitimacy on Korean Air’s response and epilogue of the case: ex-vice president Cho Hyun-ah (Heather Cho)’s trial within Korea court. Therefore in this paper, the greater focus will be given on this data set, as this one is regarded as the essential data set that deliberately supports claims to answer the research question, while first data set is regarded as ‘primary’ data which serves as supportive information prior to analysis.

This particular data set are expected to offer various viewpoints of how legitimacy that Korean Air aimed to frame is lost, in which some may base on societal reactions of the case. Influence of the media – both traditional offline ones and newly emerging online ones – on individual’s perception on the case can be gigantic. That is to say, whether Korean Air and the owner family can win the media’s consent by satisfying media’s evaluation standard on their actions taken regarding the case is fairly important, as further damage on reputation will vary depending on their task here.

3.2.3 Method: legitimation – Critical Discursive Analysis (CDA)

Similar to how Vaara and Tienari (2008) adopted it for their paper, it is worth deploying critical discursive analysis (hereafter CDA) perspective for this paper as well. Defined as “a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (van Dijk, 2001), CDA, as discursive approach, is capable of demonstrating how discourse influences the processes of social changes and events by connecting to other social elements (Fairclough, 2003).

Although it may not be the only option available, CDA is expected to be quite useful approach when dealing with controversial MNC actions, which requires critically oriented analysis (Vaara & Tienari, 2008). It involves a built-in critical stance, which is prevalent when attempting to analyze controversial societal issues. Fairclough (1989, 2003) and van

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22 This may vary – some may call for ethics, some with efficiency, and so on.
Dijk (1998) have particularly pointed out that CDA scrutinizes the role of discourse in the “social constitution of power relations and structures of domination in contemporary society” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; p.3).

Along with this aspect, CDA scholars has made significant contribution to advance the linguistic analysis associated with micro-level discursive strategies that are employed to legitimate controversial cases, actions and so on (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999).

According to Vaara and Tienrai (2008), Van Leeuwen and Wodak in 1999, based on van Leeuwen’s previous work: grammar of legitimation, developed distinguished models of legitimating strategies23. Specifically, they have elaborated their strategies into five general types of semantic-functional strategy: “the ways in which language functions and is used for the construction of legitimacy” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; p.5).

The five models are (Vaara & Tienari, 2008):

1. Authorization
2. Rationalization
3. Moral evaluation
4. Mythopoesis
5. Normalization

As the name may suggests, authorization model offers legitimacy by referencing to the authority, namely tradition, custom, law or individuals whom may have widely-accepted authority of some kind is conferred. Legitimacy via rationalization is gained, when taking utility from “specific actions based on knowledge claims that are accepted in a given context as relevant” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; p.5). Moral evaluation legitimatizes an organization’s action by referring to specific value systems that offer moral basis needed for legitimation. Legitimation through mythopoesis is conducted via narratives; as the term narrative alludes, telling stories or constructing necessary narrative structure is the mean of indicating how the discussed issue in question relates to the past or the future for the process of legitimation. Last model: normalization, from Vaara et al.’s 2006 paper, “seeks to render something legitimate by exemplarity”; it is a method of imbuing legitimacy by referring to similar

23 For the purpose of the paper, same tools will be used to analyze de-legitimating strategies as well
practices, precedence and/or actions occurred in the past (what Vaara et al. referred as ‘retrospective’ references) and also those expected to occur in the nearby future (what Vaara et al. referred as ‘prospective’ references).

They can be – in fact quite often – intertwined in specific texts and multiple legitimation, which is quite notable. The importance of these strategies is recognized as they offer us an understanding of how sense-making for the legitimacy process is conducted and applied at the textual level. Therefore it can be claimed that CDA perspective contributes to illustrate ways in which “specific ideas and practices are legitimated in communication in and around MNCs” (Vaara & Tienari. 2008; p.8; Geppert, 2003; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).
4 Findings

In this section, the results of the study are presented. Out of five legitimacy CDA tools mentioned, four are mainly employed to discuss delegitimization of Korean Air’s countermeasures after the incident: authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation and normalization\textsuperscript{24}. Each tool is supported with strategic media texts to elaborate on process of delegitimization of the case.

4.1 Delegitimization constructed through authorization

The strategic CDA tool to discuss consequential legitimacy in this section is authorization. Authorization relies on reference to institutionalized authority, which could be personal (referring to a widely-accepted expert, for an instance) or impersonal (tradition, law, knowledge, and so on) (Vaara & Tienari, 2008). Authorization in this section mainly served a role of delegitimization; the media texts often referred to relevant Korean laws when conducting strategic delegitimization of Korean Air’s actions.

The major breach that the media see Cho has conducted are: altering course of airplane, coercion and business interference. Prior to media text analysis in upcoming subsections, the first that needs to be done to understand how delegitimization challenges proceeded through is therefore to elaborate the notion and consequences of relevant terms and each crime. Of all mentioned in the appendices 5, 6 and 7, there are particular portion of the terms that need to be focused. The first essential term is an ‘aircraft captain’ which according to Aviation Act - Article 50 is:

“Each person responsible for the flight safety of an aircraft (hereinafter referred to as "plane captain") shall direct and supervise the crew of the aircraft” (appendix 6).

Second is the term “in flight” from Article 2 of Aviation Safety and Security Act, due to its remarkable impact on the legitimacy challenge:

“The term "in flight" means from the time all the doors of an airplane close after passengers aboard the airplane until the time all the doors of the airplane open for passengers to disembark.”

With those in mind, now, let’s observe each crime; first one is Article 42 (Crime of Altering Course of Airplane), which according to the Aviation Safety and Security Act is explained as:

\textsuperscript{24} Mythopoesis is briefly mentioned, but with no supporting strategic media text.
“Any person who impedes the normal flight of an airplane by forcing the airplane in flight to alter course by a deceptive plan or power shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year but not more than ten years [Article 42 (Crime of Altering Course of Airplane)].”

Based on Criminal Acts Chapter XXXIV Crimes Against Credit, Business And Auction, Article 314 (Interference with Business), on the other hand, is shown as:

“A person who obstructs another from exercising his right by violence or intimidation, or coerces one to do any unobliged work, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years.”

Last but not least, Criminal Acts Chapter XXXVII Crimes of Obstructing Another From Exercising His Right define Article 324 (Coercion) as:

“A person who obstructs another from exercising his right by violence or intimidation, or coerces one to do any unobliged work, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years.”

4.1.1 Normative legitimacy – personal legitimacy

Suchman (1995), Heidhues et al (2012) and Brinkerhoff (2005) have mentioned that personal legitimacy considers personal reputation, status and charisma of organizational leader and staff. While the other aspects of normative legitimacy are concerned about ‘action’ aspect, personal traits are given greater concern when conducting delegitimization strategies based on personal legitimacy. A legitimacy challenge via authorization, in this circumstance, can be initiated by impersonal factors (reference to a set of relevant laws) and personal factors (reference to an expert). In that sense, both the first official reaction (the statement of stance) and the third official reaction (the public apology advertisement) faced the media’s critic based on legal aspects, as more contradictory evidences against Korean Air were discovered over time. These eventually allowed the media to opt disauthorization strategy to challenge legitimacy issues which were particularly linked with questioning towards not only Cho’s qualification, charisma and leadership as the vice president, but also to those of Korean Air’s board of management members.

An easy-to-overlook matter, specifically from the second sub-subsection of the first official reaction, is Korean Air’s attempt to nullify criticism associated with Cho’s act of arrogation/misfeasance and to dodge legal responsibility of breaching the Article 42 of the Aviation Safety and Security Act. To do so, Korean Air has publicly announced to the media its claim that the principal agent of the aircraft return was the captain, as it is his right and
responsibility to do so, whether such claim sounds convincing enough to persuade the relevant stakeholders. In furtherance of strongly emphasizing that there were no procedural issues, Korean Air added that the decision to do so was conducted as a result of consultation between the captain and Cho (Park, 2014). Its attempt, however, was not viewed legitimate by the general public and the media; Business Watch, for an instance, has criticized the board member’s decision to release such buck passing official reaction regarding the case, as it seems a misleading choice for the long-term interest of Korean Air as a company, and for its stakeholders. It sets up negative and criticizing mood throughout its article by indirectly condemning them attempting to dodge their responsibility (and potentially their inappropriate usage of leadership), mentioning that:

“… through this, Korean Air decided to make a scapegoat of the then aircraft captain to protect ex-vice president Cho” (translated; Yoon, 2014).

While the aspects of Cho, Hyun-ah and Korean Air board members’ leadership are questioned as they shirked what deemed to be their responsibility, further evidences revealed support the media’s legitimacy challenge via authorization; one notable evidence to take a look at is an arraignment from the Korean prosecution that Kyunghyang Shinmun acquired with a help of an incumbent National Assembly member Seo, Young-kyo from The Minjoo Party of Korea. The arraignment confirmed several important statements which refuted Korean Air’s rhetoric and therefore negatively influenced legitimacy and legal liability defense that Korean Air was planning. Kyunghyang Shinmun’s article revealed direct speeches associated with flight route obstruction, business interference and coercion from the ex-vice president Cho Hyun-ah, further empowering delegitimization of personal legitimacy involved with the case. The collection of her speeches to be shown below, which were critically impactful to challenge Cho and Korean Air’s legitimacy, are as follows (Goo & Kim, 2015):

25 It turned out as a lie later in 2015; http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201501160600015

26 Hangul: “이를 통해 조 부사장에게 쏘린 ’월권, 직권남용’의 비난 화살에 기장이라는 방패를 세웠다.”

27 Hangul: 더불어민주당
“(shaking her fingers at the female flight attendant) Hey you, search for the manual! Go on your knees and find it, now! I can’t let someone who is not well-aware of the manual stay on this aircraft, take this bitch off the aircraft!” (translated)

“(shouting at the chief purser Park) Stop this aircraft right now. I will not let this aircraft to take-off. Tell the captain to stop the aircraft, now!” (translated)

When the chief purser Park attempted to dissuade Cho from ordering to return the aircraft, saying:

“we cannot stop the aircraft as it is entering the runway,” (translated)

Cho replied with scold, answering him:

“I don’t care. You attempt to defy me? How you dare to speak back to me?” (translated)

She repeatedly added:

“I said, stop the aircraft now!” (translated)

It was also revealed in this arraignment that the chief purser Park, since he was deeply pressured and threatened by Cho, requested a need to return the plane to the captain, after the flight has already moved to the runway. He told the then captain that:

“The vice president is angry, swearing at the crew members due to inflight services. She is highly demanding an ejection of a crew member” (Goo & Kim, 2015).

Combination of information revealed by the above-mentioned arraignment from the media and additional testimony from the Korean Air employees describing the incident allow us to conjecture, that Cho being present on the aircraft during the incident very likely, through

28 Hangul: 동시에 삿대질을 하면서 “야 너, 거기서 매뉴얼 찾아. 무릎 꿇고 찾으란 말이야. 서비스 매뉴얼도 제대로 모르는데, 안 데리고 갈 거야. 저 X 내리라고 해”라고 외쳤다.

29 Hangul: 조 전 부사장은 “이 비행기 당장 세워. 나 이 비행기 안 뜯을 거야. 당장 기장한테 비행기 세우라고 면락해”라고 호통쳤다

30 Hangul: 박씨는 “이미 비행기가 활주로에 들어서기 시작해 비행기를 세울 수 없다”고 만류했다.

31 Hangul: 하지만 조 전 부사장은 “상관없어. 내가 나한테 대들어. 양다 대고 말대꾸야”라고 꾸짖었다

32 Hangul: “내가 세우라고따”라는 말도 3-4 차례 반복했다.

33 Hangul: “부사장이 객실 서비스와 관련해 육을 하며 화를 내고 있고 승무원의 하기를 강력히 요구하고 있다”고 추가 보고했다.
coercion, constricted and interfered the cabin crews’ exercise of their righteous power. There are several aspects that were therefore pinpointed out by the media; first is the fact that the ex-vice president caused the incident during the pre-flight checks – and thus the incident was conducted ‘in flight’, according to the description of the case. Second and most commonly opinionated view among the media is regarding Cho’s act of arrogation. If anyone makes a final decision in a plane, it must be a captain’s right to do so, not any executives of the plane-owning company. Chosun Ilbo quoted Professor34 Ham, Dae-young’s opinion to emphasize such view:

“aircraft captain has authority to dispose of any happenings in the aircraft;”

for that the captain’s authority should be respected that:

“even a president of a nation is not supposed to disobey the captain’s order when in an aircraft35” (translated; J. Choi, 2014).

Needless to say, the owner family members are of no exception from this rule (Ha, 2014).

It is important to notice that, ironically, Cho was on the flight in the capacity of a passenger, not of an aircraft captain. Videlicet, in legal sense she is no different from any other passengers; her then title of vice president during the incident does not – and should not – grant her a legitimate legal right to return the aircraft to eject chief purser. It was of no surprise, according to Yonhap News, the ex-vice president Cho was found guilty and sentenced 1 year in prison at the first trial, though in an appeal she was acquitted on the particular crime of flight route obstruction, whilst being sentenced to 10 months in a jail with a stay of execution for two years for other crimes (Yim, 2015). In their attempt to further de-legitimate Korean Air’s defense, various media including News1 reported what the department of justice commented after the first trial specifically regarding the crime of business interference, as it further strengthens the impact of the court’s ruling toward the general public:

“The ex-vice president Cho was the crew members’ superior responsible for inflight service business affairs. However, even when considering that she had power given to reschedule the cabin crews’ work and even exclude them if and where needed, she should

34 Visiting professor of College of Aviation, Jungwon University.

35 Hangul: “항공기 안에서 벌어지는 일들에 대한 모든 처분 권한은 기장에게 있습니다. 대통령이라도 억울 수 없어요.”
have exercised her power in more appropriate manner prior to boarding on the aircraft\textsuperscript{36}(translated; Park, 2015).

Hankook Ilbo as well has given a strong criticism in its short editorial, raising concern towards appropriateness of Cho’s action which acted against not only the laws but Korean Air’s legitimacy defense:

“Even when she was in the airplane that is owned by the company where she is employed as the vice president, even when she was in charge of in-flight service, there are minimum rules that must be respected as a passenger. It is very surprising to see such arrogant attitude when the flight during the incident, full of 250 passengers, was already proceeding to take-off\textsuperscript{37} (translated; “[Editorial],” 2014).”

4.1.2 Normative legitimacy – procedural legitimacy

While the previous subsection addressed the media’s legitimacy challenges towards personal legitimacy mainly on basis of impersonal factors: the relevant Korean laws, this subsection will address the media texts that questioned legitimacy of Korean Air’s procedures taken to handle the case during and after the incident via reference to experts and their knowledge.

In the media text provided by Yonhap news, the views from many professionals in the field of economics, consulting and communication are presented to strengthen its legitimacy challenge toward the case. A reference to Choi, Chul-gyu the representative of Human Solution Group\textsuperscript{38} was quite notable to challenge the procedural legitimacy of Korean Air’s actions taken regarding the case, particularly towards the official reactions taken. In the public apology from Korean Air, there was no direct mentioning of assaulter of the incident, making the apology a hollow one. From this, whether Korean Air properly understood the gravity of the situation is questionable, better yet it would be plausible to claim it

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\textsuperscript{36} Hangul: "조 전 부사장이 객실 승무원에 대한 상사로서 업무를 총괄하는 지위에 있었다. 그리고 업무배제와 스케줄 조정 권한 등을 가지고 있었다고 하더라도 항공기 탑승 전에 마땅한 절차에 따라 진행해야 했다"

\textsuperscript{37} Hangul: "아무리 자신이 부사장으로 있는 회사의 항공기이고, 스스로 기내서비스를 총괄하는 위치에 있다 하더라도 승객으로서 지켜야 할 최소한의 규정이 있다. 더구나 250 명의 승객이 탑승해 있었고 이미 항공기가 출발한 상황이었다니 그 안하무인의 태도에 놀라움을 금할 수 없다."

\textsuperscript{38} Korean Consultant Company, according to Yonhap news.
\end{flushleft}
intentionally ignored the gravity. Choi therefore reviewed the apology advertisement to be quite deceptive to the audience; in the Yonhap news’ article, he asserted that:

“the apology ads from Korean Air not only lack a clear reference of principal agent and object of the apology, but also misses emotional sympathy toward the victim of the incidents. It just does not feel like a real and sincere apology” (Y. Kim, 2014).

To offer theoretical justification for his view, Choi emphasized that a need for firms to adhere to ‘CAP’ principal when making an apology advertisement. Elaborating on what the ‘CAP’ principal is, he explained that ‘C’ stands for ‘care and concern’, ‘A’ stands for ‘action’ and ‘P’ stands for ‘Prevention’ (Y. Kim, 2014). He briefly described the components ‘C’ and ‘P’ as a sense of apology and promise of recurrence prevention, respectively. While the components ‘C’ and ‘P’ are indeed important, the most important one, according to Choi’s claim, is the ‘A’ component. That is to say, the ‘A’ component: Action is the part that elaborates on what specific actions will be taken to prevent a similar happening in the future. Choi expounded his view by stating:

“when looking at a wrong apology, it usually lacks the ‘A’ component while it has the ‘C’ component. Korean Air’s apology advertisement is a prime example that fits this observation” (translated).

He further added:

“Only when there is the ‘A’ component (in an apology) vividly noticeable, the audience may witness ‘there may possibly be a notable change (to rectify wrong doings)” (translated).

With principal narrated so far, legitimacy challenge was conducted via the expert offering a suggestion of what should have been done instead. Yonhap news viewed that the procedurally inappropriate apology hindered retrieving the situation for Korean Air; Choi, who represents Yonhap news’ voice in this case, hence stressed:

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39 최철규 대표는 “사과의 주체도, 대상도 명확하지 않고 피해당한 사람에 대한 감정적 공감이 빠져 있어 진짜 사과라는 느낌이 들지 않는다”고 말했다.

40 Hangul: 최 대표는 “잘못된 사과문을 보면 A는 빠지고 C만 들어가는데 대한항공의 사과 광고가 그렇다”면서 “A가 있어야 원가 제대로 달라지겠구나 이런 걸 느낄 수 있다”고 말했다.
“Being honest and sincere may seem like a way to suffer a loss but in a long run, it is the way to reduce potential risks” (translated; Y. Kim, 2014).

Reference to authorization to judge legitimacy issue can often be confused with that employing rationalization, as the experts referred for the authorization often seeks to bring utility from their theories to rationalize their views. Both often share similar areas of analysis; they, however, differ depending on which aspect is given a greater focus. Yonhap chose Choi particularly for his expertise in corporate communication and consulting, which adds a significant amount of credibility per se to persuade its target audience.

4.2 Delegitimization through rationalization

While rationalization as one of the CDA tools stands on the basis of common sense, it can also be stated that obtaining legitimacy through rationalization is also achieved by taking utility from “specific actions based on knowledge claims that are accepted in a given context as relevant” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; p.5). In this chapter, the role of rationalization was to depict how the media, mainly Jugan-Donga, evaluated and de-legitimated the actions taken by Korean Air and its management during and after the incident.

This section, however, differs from the others, due to its structural setups caused by two factors. First factor is that while all three official statements are important, majority of the media commonly agreed, after their own diagnosis of the cases, the first official response (the statement of stance; hereafter FO1) conducted in December 8th of 2014 was the most crucial moment that Korean Air could have utilized to determine the atmosphere of public sentiment towards the case. Therefore, in consideration of its importance and its chronological order (the first official response from Korean Air), the statement of stance is the first to be analyzed word-by-word in the following subsections to evaluate how well – in terms of both end result and procedure – Korean Air adhered to their role as flight service provider. Second, the rationalization aspects of the media texts employ business knowledge including but not limited to those from management, consulting and public relations to observe how the actions taken were contrary to the business norms and practices including but not limited to management, consulting and public relations. That is to say, in this section, the first official response (the statement of stance), which act as a defensive corporate account, will also be

41 Hangul: “투명하고 솔직하면 손해 볼 것 같지만 길게 보면 리스크를 줄인다.”
presented as a complementary text – at least certain specific parts – for the media text, prior to presenting the latter. This is to highlight and strengthen the legitimacy challenge that the media text will provide.\(^{42}\)

### 4.2.1 Normative legitimacy – consequential legitimacy

In assessment of eligibility of Korean Air’s legitimation strategies, normative legitimacy is most critiqued and commentated legitimacy by the media for this case. The first to be discussed through tactics of rationalization is consequential legitimacy, which in short summary understood as legitimacy based on how consequences of actions taken by an organization are viewed. This subsection will discuss how the media text collected explicitly showed the way media, through use of first two ‘A’ elements: apology and apologia proposed in Jugan Donga, challenged legitimacy of Korean Air’s actions: ‘has Korean Air done the right thing?’

Media commonly regarded that Korean Air failed to utilize opportunity it had prior to conducting the statement of stance, making number of questionable choices which evoked morality associated challenges instead. The immediate criticism that followed the statement was on its discursive elements. Various media has pointed out that the phrases used in the stance focused more on justifying Cho’s behavior, rather than factually depicting what has happened and what Korean Air would do accordingly. Business Watch, for an instance, subtitled its article as “…bizarre apology from Korean Air, stating ‘righteous warning that was immoderately conducted’” (translated; Yoon, 2014)

In many cases, from the gathered material, the media tend to either quote professionals (professors, consultants, etc.) in public relations, risk management and other relevant areas or let them contribute to write editorial and/or analysis of the case to conduct analysis of Korean Air’s actions in comparison to business practices and norms, which act as rationalization based delegitimization.

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\(^{42}\) This is also to prevent readers from a hassle to go back to appendix to read through the first official response, which may interrupt the flow of reading.

\(^{43}\) Hangul:대한항공 황당 사과 "지나쳤지만 지적은 당연"
In the case of Jugan Donga, Kim, Ho, the representative of THE LAB h\textsuperscript{44} was in charge for its article to challenge legitimacy of Korean Air’s first official response in comparison to business norms in conducting apology. To do so, the strategic media text from Jugan Donga took utility from the notion of “A” elements: apology, apologia and actions, respectively, which acted as a basis for rationalization-base delegitimization criticism. Its article started with a criticism, raising a question towards dubious effect of FO1:

“If one is to commit a proper apology, s/he must be able to correctly diagnosis the external circumstances and be able to accept his/her own mistake. As this nut-rage case has shown, the actual victims and the public sentiment cannot be settled with just one mere apology. Think, why did the apology backfired, even when a head of a big corporate and his daughter took the plunge and decided to apologize. The general public prioritize whether the directly involved participant (assailant in this case) truly thinks s/he has done wrong and apologize over a mere fact that the person of ‘high social status’ has conducted open apology\textsuperscript{45}” (translated; H, Kim. 2014)

As mentioned earlier in this subsection, there is a need to make reference to specific parts of the official response to make the legitimacy challenge from the strategic media text clear. Counting based on Korean language, the entire statement is composed of 134 words. To start off, the first subsection of the point one, which belongs to the first element: apology, contains total 26 words in Korean, which is about 19% of the entire statement:

“(We Korean Air) apologizes to our passengers for the inconvenience caused by the return of the aircraft, as it was an immoderation, even though the circumstance was not an emergency\textsuperscript{46}” (translated).”

The first and very immediate odd aspect about this sentence, when especially viewing the sentence in Korean, is that it lacks subject, as of the principal agent of an action – who is apologizing to the audience? In Korean, the above-mentioned particular sentence, when

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\textsuperscript{44} Consultant organization specializing in areas of leadership and organizational communication; http://thelabh.com/ (the site is in Korean)

\textsuperscript{45} Hangul: 사과를 제대로 하려면 일단 외부 상황을 정확히 판단하고, 자기 잘못을 인정할 수 있어야 한다. 땅콩회항 사건에서도 보듯, 실제 피해자는 사과문 하나로 진정되지 않는다. 큰맘먹고 대기업 오너 회장과 딸이 사과했지만 왜 역효과가 난적까. 시민들은 ‘높은 사람’의 공개 사과를 보면서 사과했다는 사실 자체보다 당사자가 정말로 자신이 잘못했다고 생각하고 사과하는 것인지에 주목한다.

\textsuperscript{46} Hangul: 비상 상황이 아니었음에도 불구하고 항공기가 다시 제자리로 돌아와 승무원을 하기시킨 점은 지나친 행동이었으며, 이로 인해 승객 분들께 불편을 끼쳐드려 사과 드립니다.
literally translated, sounds as if the aircraft returned from the JFK airport runway with ‘its own will’, contrast to how it is translated in the appendix. When translating this sentence, a phrase “we Korean Air” in a bracket had to be added, as not only it was grammatically needed but also to highlight a point that Korean Air’s intention is assumed to be sheltering Cho from the responsibility of the incident by letting the company to apologize instead\(^\text{47}\). As this sentence challenges both commonly practiced public relation rules and common senses, intention of this wording, and therefore morality of Korean Air was strongly questioned by Jugan Donga:

“The expression ‘by the return of the aircraft’ shows Korean Air uses aircraft as the principal agent, rather than vice-president, which clearly indicates their legal concerns. This apology is clearly awkward, bad enough to make the audience to speculate that the wording of the sentence is designed meticulously to guard Cho from criticism\(^\text{48}\)” (translated; H, Kim. 2014).

This alludes that Korean Air – well, at least its the owner family – is willing to prioritize saving Cho, Hyun-ah over a nullifying bad reputation that company may face and widespread discontent among its workforce. Other media found Korean Air’s decision to be irrational, as such decision is likely to worsen public sentiment. Business Watch’s analysis spots the very similar point, claiming that:

“We can clearly see the company’s willingness (?) to shelter Cho from the series of process regarding the incident\(^\text{49}\)” (translated; Yoon, 2014).

Moving on to the next element: apologia, there are 87 words in Korean (65% of the wordings in the statement) which belong to it. Based on his own risk managing consultant knowledge, experience and industry expertise, Kim, Ho the author of Jugan-Donga’s article stated that an amount of words assigned for apologia element in a public apology should not exceed 25% in general. If so, then the public apology is very likely regarded as brazen one rather than a

\(^{47}\) just like how the third official response: the apology advertisement was translated, as both the first and third response had same intention

\(^{48}\) Hangul: ‘항공기가 다시 제자리로 돌아와’라는 표현에서 주어를 부사장이 아닌 항공기로 해놓은 것은 법적인 고려인 듯한데, 누가 봐도 어색하며 잘못을 비켜가기 위한 주도면밀한 사과라는 것을 알 수 있다.

\(^{49}\) Hangul: 사건 일련의 과정에서 조 부사장은 뒤로 빼놓겠다는 의지(?)가 역력하게 보인다.
sincere one, damaging morality aspect. Considering that, take a look at the following sentence (the second main point of the statement), which argues that:

“The executives of Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services and security concerns when they are on the flight.” (translated)

This is the starting point of Korean Air’s claim to justify Cho’s deed during the incident, which seems to act as rhetorical setup for follow-up subsections. Interestingly however, while the phrase itself sounds normal – in fact, it is undoubtedly somewhat ‘too’ reasonable claim to make –, evidences that were already revealed prior to the statement challenges its rightfulness. Inevitably, the statement itself faced fair amount of sarcasm and ridicules, ranging from negative comments from the on/offline audiences, the media and even from one of its competitors – Air Asia50. The HuffPost, one of the media which also evaluated the statement, concluded with a question towards whether Korean Air has done the ‘right’ thing as a company:

“‘The executives of Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services and security concerns when they are on the flight’ – was it (Korean Air) truly intending to apologize?51” (translated;)

The remaining parts of the statement of stance will be dealt on next subsection: normative legitimacy – procedural legitimacy.

4.2.2 Normative legitimacy – procedural legitimacy

Procedural legitimacy, on the other hand, discusses whether an organization employs societally valued, accepted and regarded righteous method to achieve goals specific to itself; what Brinkoff (2005) mentioned as “doing things right.” Continuing from the previous subsection which dealt with consequential legitimacy of the first official reaction through the notion of ‘apology’ and ‘apologia’ elements, this subsection will elaborate on what procedural aspects of the case contributed to further rationalization-based delegitimization of Korean Air from the media via ‘apologia’ and ‘action’ elements. Another important ground to keep in

50 During his press conference in Seoul on 10th of December, 2014, AirAsia founder and Group CEO Tony Fernandes stated in an opening remark, “If we offer honey butter chip (a snack with enormous popularity in Korea then) to our clients, we’ll serve it in a package because we are a simple and kind carrier,” implying the Korean Air’s macadamia nut scandal and how non-sense and illegitimate it was (Y. Kim, 2014).

51 Hangul: “임원으로서 문제 제기 및 지적은 당연한 일”이라는 대한항공의 사과문은 정말 사과를 하려고 쓴 글일까?
mind for this subsection is that while rationalization is indeed the main focus, the gathered material associated with the statement of stance tends to be interrelated with moralization in some extent as well, as moral values support rationalization-based challenges as well.

Prior to discussing the strategic media texts towards Korean Air’s failure to utilize existing business norms (and thus rationalization-based delegitimization), lets take a look at corporate defensive account. While the sentences in the statement of stance attempts to legitimize the ex-vice president Cho’s deed through indirect pro-Cho nuance of the phrases, the subsection of main section 2 from the statement of stance, as a part of apologia, deliberately attempts to persuade its audience why the procedure taken during the incident – Cho’s action – was done ‘legitimately.’ The pinnacle of Korean Air’s desperate attempt to legitimatize Cho’s behavior becomes very clear, when observing the second subsection of point two from FO1:

“The executives of Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services and security concerns when they are on the flight. It is natural and reasonable for the ex-vice president Cho Hyun-ah, an executive who is responsible for inflight services and meals, to point out and problematize seemingly troublesome conducts.”

It is evident that, particularly from these sub-subsections discussed so far, Korean Air attempted to simplify the framing of the case as ‘boss penalizing irresponsible subordinate who did not follow company instruction,’ in order to secure its procedural legitimacy. However, this part of the statement still brought the media’s criticism; Jugan-Donga particularly reported on the fact that Korean Air decided to focus on ‘sheltering’ Cho, rather than clearly stating countermeasure consist of ‘five W’s and one H’52’ regarding the incident. For an instance, it pointed out that repetition, a common rhetorical device, of specific term: responsible (or responsibility) is apparent in the entire statement (Yoon, 2014). The word responsibility, in its various grammatical form, seems to be the main message that Korean Air desires to revolve around, in an effort to boost public sentiment on this incident. In that sense it is not too surprising that Korean Air repeated the exact statement of “the executives of Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services and security concerns when they are on the flight” twice.

Last, 21 words from the statement of stance were dedicated to the element: actions, which is about 16% of the statement of stance. The third main point of FO1 and its subsection claim:

We will make sure to raise the quality of our service via thorough training” (translated).

“We, Korean Air, will make sure to improve our customer service and safety concerns via thorough training of our flight attendants” (translated).

The overall tone of FO1 is quite determined, as if it claims that the problems associated with the case can be solely handled by improving the quality of the service, which is quite far from what the audiences of the statement were expecting. It attempts to strongly convey a message that Cho is responsible to commit her duty as the executive responsible for inflight services and meals, rather than the fact she ordered chief purser to be dropped off for preposterous reason. Contrary to what Korean Air hoped, Jugan Donga diagnosed that both the main point and its subsection commit a problem of drawing unpersuasive conclusion; they are very likely regarded as a blatant attempt to change the subject of the statement, hoping to divert attention of its audience. While they fit to the element: action, as they propose what will be done in the future as a response to the case, they still fail to contribute to legitimization attempt that the statement of stance was seeking. It states that:

“...(the FO1 was) far from the core aspect of the problem: ex-vice president’s faults; it rather claimed ‘(Korean Air) will make sure to raise the quality of our service via thorough training’. This is a failure” (translated; Yoon, 2014).

Another viewpoint to take is that it is not only the business experts from the outside who noticed Korean Air’s FO1 failed to adopt business knowledge commonly accepted. Hence the media also challenged the procedural aspect of the FO1 by offering viewpoints of different business expertise: Korean Air employees. Kyunghyang Shinmun in particular, via strongly condemning voices of Korean Air’s labor union, expressed the statement failed to achieve its goals. Of all refutations from the employees regarding the case, two notable (partial) quotes from the union includes (translated; “[Full text],” 2014):

(refuting the second main point) “Was the issue of macadamia nut serious enough issue to put the 250 passengers to inconvenience? You don’t just 'shit out' the words. If you want to cover the matter, at least try to give more logical explanation.”

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53 Hangul: “…사안의 핵심인 부사장 잘못과는 거리가 먼 ‘서비스 질을 높이고 승무원 교육을 강화’하겠다는 내용이었다. 역시 실패한 부분이다.”

54 Hangul: “마카데미아 맛콩 문제가 고성과 고함으로 다른 승객들에게 불쾌감과 위협감을 주고 250명의 승객의 시간을 점유할 만큼 민감한 문제였나? 말이라고 내뱉고 배설하면 그만이 아니다. 일을 덮을려면 좀 더 논리적으로 정황에 맞게 변명해라.”
(refuting the third main point of the statement and its subsection) “Thorough training is only needed for the one who caused this incident. No need to conduct training for the flight attendants. All that needs to be done is cultivation of mind and ethics for that executive board member."^55^ While reporting the employee’s comments, Kyunghyang Shinmun implied: who would – if especially s/he was directly influenced by the incident – appreciate to see what-so-called “the statement of stance”, which basically is a defense document for the ex-vice president Cho in the likeness of apology.

Overall, the media claim that the FO1 failed to do serve strategic values; it as a procedural failure was neither far-sighted nor strategic, failing to convince its audience to agree with its explanation of procedure that Korean Air adopted to handle the case. The fact that Korean Air initially offered information that is inaccurate, flawed and thus favorable particularly to ex-vice-president Cho to its stakeholders, and decided to remain silent until prosecutors started an investigation could be interpreted as deliberate attempt to prioritize securing ‘safe-spot’ for Cho over interests of its stakeholders. Videlicit, at least from the media’s perspective, the FO1 could be regarded as blatant deceit and consequently challenge toward the stakeholders, resulting in notable damage in exchange legitimacy. After all, like how Kim, Ho of Jugan Donga evaluated:

“(…this statement of stance) was destined to be a brazen apology fooling the audience, quality and quantity wise"^56^ (H. Kim, 2014).

4.3 Legitimation through moral evaluation

Moral evaluation, often interchangeably used with the term moralization, as a CDA tool constructs legitimacy by referring to certain value system which suggests moral basis for legitimation (Vaara & Tienari, 2008). By its nature, discourses are commonly legitimated through moral evaluation; other CDA tools addressed in the paper include moral evaluation in some extent. However, in this section, a greater and explicit focus on legitimacy challenge from morality-based value system will be explored. Addressing the media articles that highlight Cho and Korean Air as the assaulter, portraying the chief purser, the female flight

^55^ Hangul: “철저한 교육은 이 일을 일으킨 본인만 각성하면 된다. 승무원 교육은 필요없다. 해당임원의 인격 수양 및 윤리의식만 고치면 된다.”

^56^ Hangul: …양적, 질적으로 모두 빼빼한 사과가 될 운명이었다.
attendant, the first-class passenger and the rest of the passenger as the victim allow us to observe how the media challenged Korean Air’s legitimacy defense via moral evaluation. The central value systems to be covered, as discursive practices of moralization, throughout this section include following:

1) Personnel in the top management position must not lose sight of the fact that business must not be mixed with pleasure
2) Humanistic discourse: Legally assured rights of an individual as an employee should not be hindered by an interest of a company
3) Sincerity of an apology must be clear, with shift action.

4.3.1 Pragmatic exchange legitimacy and normative personal legitimacy

As previously defined in Suchman (1995)’s literature, exchange legitimacy is gained when constituents / stakeholders benefit from organizational policies. To wit, constituents can also take exchange legitimacy back if the policy by their supporting organization harm them instead. Unlike most other subsections in this paper, this subsection will deal with both pragmatic exchange legitimacy and normative personal legitimacy simultaneously under central moral value of: ‘Personnel in the top management position must not lose sight of the fact that business must not be mixed with pleasure’, as the both legitimacy issues are heavily interrelated, and thus are important issues to be reckoned with. The legitimacy challenge in this section evolves around both ex-vice president Cho and the first-class passenger, who has noticed Korean Air and ex-vice president Cho acted against her interest as the customer.

As elaborated earlier in the section 3.13, the first-class passenger was another notable victim of the case, whose remarkable influence on legitimacy challenge should not be underestimated. Purchasing first class ticket for a flight service costs a lot more compared to that of an economy seat. Needless to say, customer may expect at least the same or greater amount of utility value from what s/he purchases; in this case, first-class passengers pay such amount in an exchange for a pleasant flight experience. That is to say, the incident and the reaction taken by Korean Air is likely to be considered breach of pragmatic exchange legitimacy against the first-class passenger, not only by the passenger per se but by the media as well.

Various media commonly agreed that Cho’s claim that she was truly concerned about inflight services during the official reactions, investigation and trials to defend herself, failed to appeal her innocence when considering how her actions were against with the interest of the
passengers. Various media including MoneyS argue that Cho – ironically as the board member who is responsible for inflight services – should have implemented any of the following actions (Choi, 2014):

1. Asking for a pardon before and after the incident to the other first-class passenger.
2. Contacting the first-class passenger (either face-to-face or phone call) by herself immediately, rather than letting the passenger contacting the call center due to her frustration of poor service.
3. Offering an appropriate compensation rather than a valueless one.
4. Not requesting a shameless request.

As depicted earlier, however, none of above was achieved, resulting in two points: 1. Cho as the person in charge was completely oblivious of business and private matter, indicating potential legitimacy challenge arising from personal attributes; 2. the passenger’s denial to cooperate, which can be interpreted as her exercise of rights to take exchange legitimacy back. The media viewed that the first-class passenger’s response per se refutes and negates Korean Air’s legitimacy defense; to demonstrate how pragmatic exchange legitimacy was damaged as a result of violation of first-class passenger’s right, Kyeonghyang Shinmun decided to present parts of what the prosecution presented during the first trial: Kakao Talk\(^{57}\) messages that the first-class passenger sent to her acquaintance. The message vividly showed how irrational Cho’s deed particularly during the incident seemed to the first-class passenger (translated; “Cho, Hyun-ah,” 2015):

“Oh wow, this is insane. Plane has not even fully departed, and I noticed there is a crazy bitch behind me”\(^{58}\)

“Perhaps she is not given what she demanded to the flight attendant? She is keep screaming, and now it’s a total mess that chief purser has to come (to deal with this)\(^{59}\)” (translated;

“Oh wow. She is telling (him) to alight from the plane. (She is) telling the chief purser to alight from the plane with his belongings”\(^{60}\)

\(^{57}\) Popular messenger program in Korea

\(^{58}\) Hangul: “미쳤나봐 어 démarche. 비행기 출발 안 했는데 뒤에 미친 X 이야.”

\(^{59}\) Hangul: “승무원한테 뭐 달라했는데 안쳤나봐. 계속 소리지르고, 사무장 와서 완전 개난리다.”

\(^{60}\) Hangul: “혈 내리래. 무조건 내리래. 사무장 집 들고 내리래.”
“Wait, so we are seriously letting the plane stick back to the gate. It is really going back. (what the flight attendant / chief purser did) shouldn’t be too much of problem, at least in my view… Huh, I have never seen such circumstance like this before.”

“Hell, how many people have to suffer just because of that woman?”

Specific quotes chosen by Kyunghyang Shinmun vividly illustrates the first-class passenger’s sense of surprise, frustrating tones and nuances via particular words (e.g. suffer), indicating no solicitude was present for her during the incident and therefore her demand-due-rights were infringed.

Premium Chosun ’s legitimacy challenge approach via moral evaluation differed on the other hand; it quoted the first-class passenger during her media interview regarding how she felt about Korean Air’s action taken after the case, which clearly indicates failure of conducting any of the above mentioned four points (translated; “’Cho, Hyun-ah incident’,” 2014):

When the first-class passenger asked: “just who is that person to make such mess?”’, the flight attendant near her spared her breath and just said “it’s an internal issue.”

“As I was angry by the fact that such intimidating atmosphere was formed, and the flight was returned during then just because of that (nut) services, I contacted Korean Air to remonstrate (regarding the poor service experienced). Then, this so-called managing director called me back, requesting ‘try not to interview with the media, and please tell them you have received a good apology, if interviewed ever while telling me that he will send me Korean Air calendar and miniature model aircraft (as a compensation to her inconvenience)”'

She further added:

61 Hangul: “헐 진짜 (비행기를 게이트로) 붙인다. 정말 붙여. 내가 보기엔 그리 큰 잘못 아닌데. 살다살다 이런 경우 처음 봐.”

62 Hangul: “도대체 이 여자 때문에 도대체 몇 사람이 피해 보는 거야”

63 Hangul: 박씨가 ‘어떤 분이시기에 저러는 거냐’고 묻자 승무원은 “회사 내부적인 일”이라며 말을 아꼈다.

64 Two sentences merged due to grammatical structure of Hangul: “고작 (땅콩) 서비스 때문에 비행기를 돌리고 협약한 분위기를 조성했다는 것에 화가 나 대한항공에 항의했다니 이를 뒤 상무라는 사람이 전화를 걸어와 ‘인터넷은 자제해주시고 하시더라도 사과를 잘 받았다고 이야기해달라’고 하더라.” / 그는 “해당 임원이 대한항공 달력과 모형 항공기를 택배로 보내주겠다더라.”
"I was further enraged by the fact that (Cho and Korean Air) did not make proper apology to not only me, but to the rest of the passengers."65

Views & News complemented Premium Chosun’s selection of quotes:

The first-class passenger asked back, “even in my eyes (what Cho did during the incident) was unreasonably harsh; it’s just wrong. She could have pointed out (flaws) after the flight was done; (the plane) is not her office, is it?”66 (translated; H. Kim, 2014)

What Premium Chosun cited indicates that Cho seriously lacked self-control and discernment during the incident. Although not particularly emphasized in Kyunghyang Shinmun, Premium Chosun or Views & News’ articles, a lot of other media article texts have reinforced Cho’s role within Korean Air: the board member who is responsible for inflight services, which is considered quite ironic. This indirectly contributes to heavily crack down her legally-concerned defense claiming that her action was righteously conducted as part of her task, rather than unjustifiable personal rant. The media text from Premium Chosun and Views & News also indicate that the first-class passenger’s right-to-know what exactly occurred during the incident that bugged her was intentionally masked, which clearly acts against her interest; she only got to know the whole story through the media articles. Poor customer service was notable as well, which fueled her anger. These aspects challenge sincerity of Korean Air and Cho’s apology, leading the media to speculate that perhaps their major concern is just their legal defense, rather than providing a reasonable value to its customers.

The media texts emphasize that being the only non-Korean Air employee witness of the incident during the incident empowered the first-class passenger’s testimony morality wise; her claims demolished Korean Air’s communication strategy and personal traits of Cho as vice president, further amplifying an image of liar that Korean Air and Cho acquired from the incident. It is of no surprise that the official communicative reactions became targets of ridicule by its designated receivers; when even the directly involved customer do not view it

65 Hangul: “나뿐만 아니라 당시 모든 승객들에게 제대로 된 사과를 하는 것 같지 않아 더 화가 난다.”

66 Hangul: “그는 “제가 빠도 너무 심했다는 생각이 들 정도였기 때문에 (조 부사장의 행동은) 정말 백번 잘못한 것”이라며 “지적은 비행기에서 내려서도 할 수 있는 건데, 본인 사무실은 아니라지 않아” 라고 반문했다.”
legitimate, who would? To the passenger, it was nothing but a mere contemptible excuse to attempt to obtain legitimacy.

4.3.2 Pragmatic exchange legitimacy

Earlier in this paper, a breach toward the first-class passenger’s right was discussed through use of rationalization, hence challenging pragmatic exchange legitimacy of Korean Air’s defense. Here in this moral evaluation section, the focus shifts; this section concentrates on legitimacy challenge based on how Korean Air’s actions adhered to the social expectation/values. Specifically, the central moral value system to be presented in this subsection is: ‘legally assured rights as an employee should not be hindered by an interest of a company’. That is to say, how the right of chief purser Park as an employee and as a human-being was interfered and thus, how this leads to a part of the media’s legitimacy challenge will be discussed. The main data to be discussed is an interview conducted by Korean Broadcasting System (hereafter KBS) with one of the victims: the chief purser Park. The interview, through the voice of chief purser Park, allows KBS to being humanistic moralization legitimacy challenge, further empowering the challenge.

Prior to the interview, however, a small contextual knowledge must be provided in order to fully comprehend why the media accused Korean Air has broken the main value system to be discussed in this section: hindering the victims’ rights as its employees. In short summary, following aspects need to be taken into account:

1. There has been a strong public suspicion in the society that Korean Air, as a giant in the Korean aviation industry, would commit to destroy evidences no matter the cost
2. Korean Air has notable influence over Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (hereafter ‘MOLIT’) in various ways, indicating possible collusion (Oh, 2014; G. Kim, 2014; Park & Oh, 2014).
3. This thereby creates a cloud of suspicion over sincerity of Korean Air’s stance regarding their apology toward the relevant victims of the case

Howbeit, this complex issue also involves a certain degree of:

1. mythopoesis and
2. authorization element

as there is a need to introduce a story to judge morality issues of the case, and to refer to legal aspects, which influence the legitimacy defense and challenge.
4. Notable share of suspicion turns out to be true, which contributed to damage Korean Air’s legitimacy defense as they face challenges based on both generic morality and specific moral value systems (“(Korean Air) attempted to destroy…”, 2014; H. Kim & G. Kim, 2014; “The prosecutors concluded that…”, 2015).

Now let’s move on; based on this contextual information. in order to construct the story of the case from the victims’ perspective, KBS News conducted an interview with chief purser Park. The interview with the chief purser Park further confirmed the claims mentioned above, regarding how Park’s legal rights as an employee were violated, as Korean Air attempted to conceal evidences. The media texts from it showed that the victims – represented by Park, in this case – were not convinced by Korean Air’s apology and legitimacy defense attempt conducted so far; the discourse between the anchor and the chief purser Park has clearly expressed his distrust toward Korean Air as a company and MOLIT, as he has noticed Korean Air’s morally and legally questionable behavior: an attempt to conduct deliberate and systematic destruction of evidences under MOLIT’s direct/indirect assistance.

From the interview media text provided by KBS News, certain phrases used by both the chief purser and the anchor are notable, as a humanistic discourse indicating breaching of the socially accepted value. Through both participants’ voice in their discourse, pragmatic exchange legitimacy challenge toward Korean Air is vividly shown as Park depicts the circumstances during then. The following first half of translated transcription of the interview between the anchor and Park shows how Park viewed the investigation was rigged and thus illegitimate due to Korean Air’s influence; certain relevant phrases that evoke questioning of morality toward Korean Air as it breaches Park’s right as human-being and as an employee are underlined from the below text:

**Anchor:** “So, how were you noticed about the MOLIT investigation?”

**Park:** “I was actually informed by the company, who requested me to show up to the office first.”

**Anchor:** “That is to say, you did not get the notice call directly from MOLIT?”

**Park:** “It did not happen.”

**Anchor:** “Okay, so how were you informed?”

**Park:** “I was told that I need to show up to the company and talk with the company personnel. So I was called to Korean Air headquarter located in Gimpo, and during then I was ordered to speak contrary to the truth.”

**Anchor:** “Ah, they gave you a guideline of what to say?”
Park: “Yes. They have already determined guideline for me of what to say during the investigation; it was like a scenario already written to legitimize ex-vice president Cho’s action. What they wanted from me, basically, is to accept their scenario and move on with it. I was not allowed to criticize ev-vice president’s fault, so I was forced to write an apology and explanation of the case. My superior typed it, while ordered by the director in charge of in-plane cabinet.”

Anchor: “I see. So when you first attended MOLIT investigation and interrogation, how was the seat placement like?”

Park: “If there is one thing I should say before anything, this would be it: all the cabin crews were gathered and given instruction on ‘guideline’ given by Korean Air.”

Anchor: “You mean, (guideline on) answer to the all the potential questions?”

Park: “Yes. ‘Answer it this way, that way’, was basically what I was told prior to the interrogation. In addition, the company gave the crew members further specific instruction, to prepare us answering the questions that we may not be well aware of. Only after then we moved to MOLIT office for the actual interrogation. However, as the investigation goes, there was extremely weird and suspicious procedural part that I could not understand, when considering this is supposed to be an investigation by the state institution. Rather than conducting an individual interrogation, the interrogation accompanied Korean Air board members, the then captain, and so on. It was more like company briefing rather than an interrogation to discover what really happened.

Anchor: “Was the interrogation room isolated from the outside?”

Park: “There was a door. However, like I told you while ago, I could hear what was spoken in the room when I stayed outside.

Anchor: “That is to say…”

Park: “When I testified, Korean Air personnel and board members waiting outside could all hear what I was saying. At that point, it made me think that this investigation cannot remain truthful to its intended purpose.”

…

Anchor: “So, the overall intention (of the company) was to address the incident as your fault… (rather than Cho’s)”

Park: “I was forced to make false testimony that the incident occurred as a result of the then captain and I making a misjudgment.”

Anchor: “Has the company requested you to modify or erase particular document or information regarding the case?”

Park: “On 6th where I arrived, the director in charge ordered have not only me but to everyone involved – whether present there at then or not – to erase all the associated emails and initial reports.

The underlined parts of the above media text both directly and indirectly challenges Korean Air’s legitimacy defense attempt, even though the media per se (KBS News) does not give any opinion about it; the anchor, with neutral tone, rather questions problematic actions taken
by Korean Air that potentially challenges Park’s legal rights. The actual delegitimization comes from Park’s responses, which contain negative and bitter tone (when reading the transcribed media text and hearing him from the interview). There are two notable aspects to pay attention to Park’s responses: first is his vivid description of the circumstance, which indicates how environment around him formed by MOLIT and Korean Air during then restricted him, thereby criticizing Korean Air’s apology as burying its head in the sand. For an instance, some of Park’s answers to the anchor in previous page are worth noting:

Park: “… all the cabin crews were gathered and given instruction on ‘guideline’ given by Korean Air….

… Rather than conducting an individual interrogation, the interrogation accompanied Korean Air board members, the then captain, and so on. It was more like company briefing rather than an interrogation to discover what really happened….

…, I could hear what was spoken in the room when I stayed outside…

… the director in charge ordered have not only me but to everyone involved – whether present there at then or not – to erase all the associated emails and initial reports.”

These particular statements act as evidences to indicate that there had been systematic and organized destruction of evidences, which simultaneously pressures Park from pursuing his rights as an employee, considering contextual condition that Park does not have much power to act against MOLIT/Korean Air personnel present during then.

Second aspect to focus, which synergizes with the first aspect, is his lexical choices that are considerably negative, which indicates how Park felt his right has been illegally and immorally compromised. Examples of these include phrases such as: “forced to”, “cannot remain truthful”, “not allowed to” and so on. These further strengthens a delegitimization claim that the central value system argued in this section is, and thus defying Korean Air’s defending logic.

4.3.3 Normative personal legitimacy

Continuing from the previous subsection, it is notable that chief purser Park as a victim has also shown a sense of distrust toward Cho, Hyun-ah, due to her actions taken after the issue became publicized, as well. Hence here where normative personal legitimacy is discussed, the central value system to be addressed in this subsection is: ‘sincerity of an apology must be clear, with shift action.’ This subsection will contain the latter half of the translated transcription for the interview. Like the first half, the second half part of the interview
transcription contained some notable elements of authorization as part of its moralization-based legitimacy challenge, as it makes a reference to common sense, norm, Korean culture and language to see how media delegitimate Korean Air and ex-vice president Cho’s attempt to defend legitimacy.

In the latter half of the interview, Park mentioned that he received a slip note from ex-vice president Cho who visited his house when he was absent. Below is the part of the dialogue between the anchor and the chief purser; like how it was treated in the previous section, notable phrases are underlined:

**Anchor:** “It was reported that when the case became a lot more problematic than anticipated, ex-vice president Cho visited your home to apologize, but found you absent and thus left a slip of note instead. Have you seen it?”

**Park:** “She forcefully ‘apologized’ to me even though I have clearly stated that I am not willing to receive an insincere apology from the teeth outward, as far as I am aware of. Then today I found out the note that media has covered when I got home. The note fell as soon as I opened the door and…”

**Anchor:** “Do you have the note with you?”

**Park:** “Yes.”

**Anchor:** “Do you mind if I can take a look at it?”

**Park:** “I would like to show it to you anyway. It is really questionable… what on earth is this supposed to be a sincere apology – an apology from someone who claims to be prepared to apologize?”

**Anchor:** “Let me take a look. So, in this handful size of a note, she wrote an apology with a pen:

‘Dear chief purser Park,

I was intending to visit you and apologize in person, but found you absent and thereby leaving this note.

I am sorry.

Cho, Hyun-ah’

So you must have seen this this morning?”

**Park:** “I found that this morning, yes.”

**Anchor:** “How did you feel when you received this note?”

**Park:** “To be honest, I felt even worse – wretched. I had a slight bit of hope within me that she will sincerely apologize but the apology seems neither prepared with careful thoughts nor with sincerity that considers me into an account. It led me to think ‘ah, that person has not changed.’”
While KBS News per se did not make its legitimacy challenge apparent in this second half of the interview as well, it implies that there is an immediate issue with Cho’s action taken toward chief purser Park after the incident, which consequently leads to questioning of her personal aspect as the ex-vice president. Although Park, from the interview, did not directly pin-pointed and define ‘problematic’ discursive elements, his last words from the script implies that discursive elements was clearly one of the issues that frustrated him. From KBS interview the implied particular problem consists of lexical choice from Cho’s letter. Cho decided to use the phrase 미안하다 (I am sorry) rather than 죄송하다 (I apologize) in her slip note. A difference in implication of the two words is fairly big in Koran language and custom; according to the National Institute of the Korean Language, the phrase 죄송하다 shows greater degree of politeness when compared to 미안하다 (국립국어원, 2012). In addition, the former tends to be used when an apologizing person consider him/herself as a superior being or on superior position, whereas the latter tends to be used when considering the one receiving apology is on either equal or superior position. If Cho and Park were under friendship rather than a superior-subordinate relationship, saying ‘sorry’ could have worked as an apology. However, when taking their difference in age (Cho was born in 1974, Park was born in 1971) and difference in their status (one being vice president and the other being chief Purser back then) into an account, it would be hard to claim, at least to Park as he mentioned, what Cho did was a valid apology. Clarity of sincerity, let alone sincerity per se, was nowhere to be found, as her action was closer to that of superior treating her subordinate.

Based on these aspects, it could be said that Cho’s hand-written slip note shows her denial of truly understanding the seriousness of the case, resulting in delayed apology. She has not given a proper consideration of how negatively forcing false witness then reluctantly apologizing would be judged and portrayed by the media and relevant stakeholders; it is suspected, by the eyes of Park and other audiences, that she attempted to make this apology not because she felt a sincere need to do so but rather because of massively huge negative public sentiment against her. Such view strengthens the view point that she attempted to breach socially accepted value within Korea.

68 Hangul: 국립국어원
Along with the fact she left a memo rather than rescheduling her visit for a proper face-to-face apology, a grammatical mistake, for an instance – although KBS did not point it out even though it did not also fix the grammar when presenting it on the interview –, reflects how she gave a minimum concern about a need to apologize. In principal, it is a minor mistake; she originally wrote 드릴려고 in her memo when the correct one is 드리려고 (this literally means to give; in this case, it combines with the word 사과 to form a phrase ‘to apologize’). However, it may be regarded bad enough for the receiver of the message: Park to think of it as a sign that Cho did not give much concern about him and a need to apologize to him. This apology, with combination of all these aspects addressed so far, thus served the opposite effect; chief purser Park’s interview with KBS anchor demonstrates that Park is rather disappointed and distrust Cho even further, shown by his statement in the media text shown earlier in this subsection:

“To be honest, I felt even wore – wretched. I had a slight bit of hope within me that she will sincerely apologize but the apology seems neither prepared with careful thoughts nor with sincerity that considers me into an account. It led me to think ‘ah, that person has not changed.’”

Her qualification as a leader was thus questioned, which inevitably also led to challenge toward legitimacy of Korean Air’s defense attempt regarding the case.

4.4 Legitimation through normalization

Comparison to precedents is often a reasonable way to judge whether a matter within an organization is legitimately handled. Quoting Vaara, Tienari and Laurila, normalization, what aims to grant legitimacy by referring to a ‘normal or natural’ behavior, “seeks to render something legitimate by exemplarity” (Vaara, Tienari and Laurila, 2006). According to them, Van Leeuwen did not include normalization as its own CDA tool; rather considered it more as a sub-type of authorization and rationalization depending on the area discussed (‘conformity legitimation’ for sub-authorization, ‘fact-of-life rationalization’ or ‘naturalization’ for sub-rationalization). However, in this paper, normalization will stand as its own CDA tool for the analysis of the case, as the media often made comparison of this case to the precedent to challenge Korean Air’ legitimacy defense attempt.

4.4.1 Normative consequential legitimacy
In this sub-section, how normalization as a tool, which is based on reference to exemplarity, has been used as a tool by the media to judge procedural legitimacy will be discussed. MK Securities in particular offers the cases of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company and Kolon Industry, which are two precedents with contrasting approach to solve their respective problems.

MK Securities commenced with the similarly-concluded case; Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, recklessly underestimated an importance of timely communication showing its sincerity and will to solve the catastrophe it confronted. It consequently failed to lessen massive loss from its defective products, in short summary (D. Kim, 2016). The loss could have lessened if it decided to properly admit and make an apology on time; it decided to not, and decision to do so ensued a man-made disaster, heavily amplifying overall net loss. Korean Air’s case is almost no different, except the root of the problem was a lot more ridiculous (at least to the various stakeholders).

On the other hand, MK Securities offered another case that is similarly initiated but concluded differently; it emphasized that how the case of Kolon Industry Inc. yielded a good result and thus act as a good guideline of how the matter should have been handled. It is remarkable how Kolon who faced tougher challenge – human casualty (the incident is called the collapse of Mauna Ocean Resort in Kyeong-Ju) – and yet yielded a better result in terms of legitimacy defense. When compared to how Korean Air worded its public apology, Kolon’s wording on its apology seems clearly a lot more reasonable; MK Securities nominated the first determining factor was the fact that Kolon clearly indicated who the apologizing principal agent is. Like how most of the media suggested, as shown in the early sub-sections of the result section, Kolon’s apology specifically mentioned that the Chairman Lee, Woong-yeol and all executive staffs apologize to the victims and their relatives, even though it did not directly cause the disaster. It therefore highlights this difference in approach between Kolon and Korean Air:

69 A subsidiary of Maeil Kyungjae News
“This is a clear contrast when compared to how Korean Air merely mentioned the company per se as the apologizing principal agent for the crisis that initiated from Cho, Hyun-ah’s deviant behavior⁷⁰” (translated; D. Kim, 2016)

The second determining point mentioned was how responsive the public apology advertisement was announced. MK securities praised how Kolon responded rapidly, without any further calculation to lessen the possible opportunity cost of delayed apology, which was somewhat proven by subsequent event - the nut-rage return:

“Now let’s compare the date of the incidents and the date of public apology for the both cases. On 19th of February, Kolon announced its public apology regarding the collapse incident that happened on 17th of February. Korean Air, on the other hand, issued the statement of stance to the media on 8th of December, and finally the public apology on 16th on the newspapers for the nut-rage case that happened in 5th of December”⁷¹” (translated; D. Kim, 2016).

Last and perhaps the most important one, as stressed throughout the entire paper, is a sincerity of the apology. Of all aspects, Kolon’s action taken completely differed the most here when compared to Korean Air, it clearly stated not only the directly associated parties that it needs to apologize to but also those who are indirectly and/or potentially involved ones as well. Specifically, in Kolon’s public apology, Kolon apologized to all involved parties, in an order of (refer appendix 4):

1. To every stakeholder (not specified however, it is just implied, as to whom is not mentioned. It is also written in bold and bigger letters)
2. The students who lost their lives and their relatives
3. The students who were injured and their relatives
4. The public and the government authorities of Korea
5. All above again

Considering this, MK Securities mentioned:

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⁷⁰ Hangul: “이것은 조현아 부사장의 일탈행동에서 시작된 회항사건에 관한 신문 사과 광고문에 ‘대한항공’이라고만 적시한 것과는 확연하게 대비된다.”

⁷¹ Hangul: 사건 발생 시점과 신문에 사과 광고를 냈 시점을 비교해보자. 코오롱은 2월 17일 밤에 발생한 사건에 대해 2월 19일자 조간신문 1면에 일제히 사과 광고를 게재했다. 대한항공은 12월 5일 발생한 사건에 대해 12월 8일 밤 11시에야 비로소 언론사에 첫 공식 사과 보도 자료를 배포했으며 신문에는 12월 16일에야 사과 광고를 냈다.”
“Kolon specifically stated each victims of the collapse incident, and apologized four times. (omitted) … Kolon was very clear expressing who, to whom, and why it is apologizing. Many who have read the public apology must have felt that Kolon’s Chairman Lee, Woong-yoel and all executive staffs are sincerely apologizing” (translated; D. Kim, 2016).

Conversely, throughout the whole apology advertisement, Korean Air did not mention any of the following relevant stakeholders at all:

1. The chief purser Park, who was eventually dropped off from the aircraft
2. The female flight attendant, who faced massive insults from Cho
3. The other first-class passenger, who had her right to have a quiet time during the service heavily interrupted
4. Entire passengers who unwilling had to sacrifice their time for not-so-funny reason,
5. The work-force who had to face additional stress from unreasonable event at all.

Rather, the apology advertisement from Korean Air apologized to unspecified public, as if that is the Maginot Line that it can compromise to. This non-committal apology resulted in a worse-off situation for Korean Air, unlike how a precedent has been handled by Kolon. Contrary to Korean Air’s result, Kolon’s case was successful for Kolon, managing to lower down public anger. Both companies made their apologies to the public, but the difference in their approach determined effectiveness of their attempt.

Once again, it must be stressed that the crucial difference that led Kolon’s apology to be successful, apart from Kolon’s timely action, is clear mentioning of who is apologizing to whom for what reason. Kolon was able to achieve its intended normative consequential legitimacy – they have done what deemed to be ‘right’ actions, making themselves exemplary precedent for others. As stressed by what was claimed in MK Securities’ article, when compared to the official apology from Korean Air, the audience can notice commitment from that of Kolon’s, which is one of the necessities for a successful apology. To audience, what Kolon has done implies that the company is taking the matter seriously, and adequately identified what needs to be done.

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72 Hangul: “코오롱은 사죄드리는 대상을 지명하면서 4 번씩 사죄했다. (중략) … 이 사과문을 접한 많은 사람들은 이용열 회장과 코오롱그룹 임직원들이 진심으로 사죄하고 있다는 것을 느꼈을 것이다.”
4.5 Legitimation through mythopoesis

To explain whether a task has been done in a rightful manner inevitably involves an act of narration; elaboration of story offers evidences of behavior that are regarded socially preferential, acceptable or perhaps appropriate. According to Van Leeuwen and Wodak’s 1999 work, mythopoesis, interchangeably used as narrativization, is defined as legitimacy obtaining tool (or process) which involves use of narratives and storytelling, connecting actions in question to the past or to the future. Unfortunately, however, there are no solid articles that may be suited for this section solely; most of them contained elements of other
5 Discussion

5.1 Prevalence of normative media texts and thus normative legitimacy challenges

Normative media texts were most prevalent ones to be provided by the Korean media, which consequentially led this paper to have six out of eight subsections from the findings to deal with normative legitimacy challenges. Similar to the case that Olga Lavrusheva discovered in her master’s thesis paper, citing previous studies of Hardy et al. (2000), Vaara et al. (2006) and Vaara and Monin (2010), such result is rather not surprising, considering how many politically challenging behaviors were conducted during the incident, and how they also initiated all other controversies, whether they are purely associated with moral responsibility or legal responsibility. This imbalance among the strategic media text for the case is believed to signify that the societal interest of the case – enragement, to be more exact – was more concerned with how Korean Air breached the social agreements regarding human rights. Therefore, the following subsections will discuss this phenomenon to discuss the case in bigger context.

5.1.1 Chaebol corporate culture and ‘Gapjil’

To see why normative legitimacy challenges have been dominant, it would be important to think of interrelated influential factors that currently challenge corporate culture within Korea: Chaebol, ‘Gapjil’, economic democracy and potentially demand for organizational justice. As mentioned earlier in the paper, changes in economic and societal environments in Korea have been bringing corresponding demand for a change in corporate culture. This tendency has been greater among the younger generation of Korean society, who found current corporate culture frustrating and thus desire a greater degree of organizational justice and economic democracy, as Cho et al. (2014) addressed. Park revealing the case despite pressure from Korean Air, the media covering the incident seriously by questioning morality of Korean Air and the owner family member and the massive public backlash reflects such phenomenon.

The cause of whole incident can be summarized as recently-created Korean term introduced earlier: Gapjil, which The New York Times translated it as “the abuse of underlings and subcontractors by executives who behave like feudal lords” (Choe, 2018). Cho’s irrational behavior during then incident was commonly regarded as Gapjil by the media, which some media linked her behavior as an evident result of Korean Air’s corporate culture allowing
Chaebol the owner family members to have unstoppable power within the organization (M, Kim. 2015). Various media (Gobal News, The PR and many others), at least in their editorial texts, agreed that Gapjil depicts one of the key roots of this case: broken power balance problem between the owner family members and the rest of the workforce occurring from the peculiar ‘Chaebol’ environment, which leads to Korean Air’s particularly oppressing, and non-communicative corporate culture (Kang, 2015; Ahn, 2015).

5.1.2 The principle factor preventing legitimacy: the owner family

In the case of Korean Air and particularly nut-rage incident, the principal agents of Gapjil were the owner family members, who have strong influence within the organization. Anachronistic nepotism has been ingrained deep within Korean Air, similar to many other existing Chaebols. However, the side effect of nepotism has been a lot more apparent in Korean Air, supported by its relatively higher rate of “Gapjil” related scandals when compared to others.

As the media de-legitimized the communication approaches that Korean Air adopted to obtain discursive legitimacy for the case, some of them also questioned effectiveness and meaningfulness of the measures taken by Korean Air. Notably Gobal News, Chosun Biz and Huffington Post KR shared similar opinions via both direct and implied messages within their media text in this regard; their common argument was that the unique ‘Chaebol factor’ of Korean Air will nullify the measures taken regardless of Korean Air PR team’s effort (You, 2014; D. Kang, 2014; S. Kang, 2014):

1. Cho family exercising excessive amount of power within Korean Air, leading no employee dare to speak ‘against’ them even if it clearly benefits Korean Air (e.g. suggesting chairman Cho, Yang-ho to take stronger measures after the nut-rage incident / passive apology, like the FO1)

2. There is no internal group or method within Korean Air to hold the owner family in check, resulting in employees equating the owner family members to Korean Air as company per se.

3. The owner family continually producing ‘Gapjil’ related headline risks, indicating no proper and sincere signs of self-reflection to appeal to the general public

As pointed by Economic Review in its 2016 article, this is of no surprise to many individuals; many individuals who previously and current work at Korean Air mentioned that the biggest drawback of Korean Air is ‘owner (family) risk’ (Yeo, 2016). The ‘owner risk’ problems addressed above have not been improved even after the incident, despite the chairman of
Hanjin group Cho, Yang-ho’s promise to improve Korean Air’s corporate culture after the incident. When more ‘Gapjil’ related incidents got publicized in 2018, internal workforce, frustrated by the owner family’s continuing feudal lord behavior, started to collect not only Gapjil-related evidences but also other illegal activities that Korean Air and its parent-company Hanjin group committed under the owner family’s order.

This irony of the internal stakeholders of the company attacking their belonging company rather than supporting it, as it failed to treat them righteously, shows how Korean Air, due to its owner family, failed to defend its legitimacy in recent cases (D. Kim, 2018). Based on evidences collected, number of government organizations: the police, prosecution, Korean Customs Service, MOLIT, Ministry of Employment and Labor(MOEL) and Fair Trade Commission (FTC) targeted Korean Air for massive inspections (including tax inspection). Adding insult to injury, in May 4th of 2018, the Korean Air workforce, subcontractors and citizens also began protesting to condemn the owner family, indicating no supporting public sentiment against the government inspections (K. Kang, 2018). Needless to say, the media started to cover those cases and the associated stakeholders’ actions, which eventually ended up with crushing Korean Air’s remaining legitimacy defense – if there is any left – for all incidents including the nut-rage case from 2014. Korean Air’s repeated mistakes clearly acted as headline risks, leading the media and the general public to wonder whether Korean Air and the owner family truly learned or acknowledged what must be truly done. This ultimately leave to one question: can the essential problem be fixed via communication tools solely?

5.2 **Less occurring delegitimization strategy and tools**

5.2.1 **Relatively smaller portion of pragmatic legitimacy challenge**

As discussed in the section 5.1, the media’s focus of the delegitimization of the case shift has been primarily on normative legitimacy challenges. Pragmatic legitimacy based delegitimization covered impactful topic of the first-class passenger and chief purser Park’s rights being severely compromised. While these are strong issues to argue per se, the media, however, rather used them to argue more of normative legitimacy issues, as they perceived these pragmatic legitimacy issues to be the result of normative ones, turning the pragmatic ones into more of supplementary issues For an instance, journalists who wrote the strategic media text with pragmatic legitimacy-based delegitimization arguments ultimately linked those to Gapjil issues, which is more associated with normative legitimacy challenges.

5.2.2 **Lack of cognitive legitimacy and mythopoesis**
In this paper, there was no strategic media text example that particularly focused on cognitive legitimacy or used mythopoesis as main legitimacy tool. First and rather obvious reason that comes to my mind is prevalence of normative legitimacy elements, which leads the media to end up primarily focusing on those. The nut-rage case per se did not trigger questioning toward Korean Air’s existence; while many aspects were challenged, both comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness elements of Korean Air were not challenged. Arguments toward those elements, interestingly however, were brought to light later on, when more Gapjil related incidents and the owner family’s acts of illegality start to expose to the public in 2018. That is to say, the nut-rage case incident may definitely have contributed to evoke the media’s cognitive legitimacy delegitimization eventually in later years; it just was not direct enough to lead to production of strategic media text during 2014.

As mentioned in the findings section, mythopoesis suffered from majorly from other elements having considerable amount of narrative building, which made it hard for mythopoesis to have its stand-alone status as strategic media text. Furthermore, by its nature, mythopoesis based strategic media text tends to be lengthier, as ‘story’ needs to be established. Most of the textual materials available: the strategic media texts, however, were not deemed lengthy enough to build story-based arguments. The best of lengthy ones found focusing on the nut-rage incident were either non-media text (e.g. book) or focused on non-legitimacy (e.g. crisis management as main topic and legitimacy as subcategory at best) topic.

Another problem, interrelated with the previous problem in some extent, is how scattered strategic media texts have been. Most of them seem to focus on fragments of the incident or certain argument deeply, rather than forming a whole story. This tendency of strategic media texts from Korean media led the data to be noticeably ‘opportunistic,’ in a way. Similar conclusion to that explaining the lack of cognitive legitimacy is driven: the media focused on mythopoesis element more when they covered the protest in May 4th, 2018, as perhaps mythopoesis is easier to develop when linking chains of events that result in legitimacy challenge.

5.3 Discrepancy between Korean Air’s expectations and actual results

Along with the fact that normative legitimacy challenges have been the most challenged aspects by the media, one of the clear discoveries from the findings section was a considerably big gap between what Korean Air thought of legitimate responses toward the
case and what the society, represented by the media in this case, thought of. The end results of Korean Air’s measures were far from their goals; they ended up infuriating designated audiences more; almost none of their measures taken was regarded appropriate. The following subsections are to discuss potential causes of such happening.

5.3.1 Different perspective on degree of seriousness

This nut-rage case is not the only ‘Gapjil’ case that occurred by the owner family members. Experiences prior to this incident should have given Korean Air what proper steps need to be considered; it would be, thereby, fair to expect Korean Air has learned what must be done to minimize public backlash. The question then is how such recognition gap occurred nonetheless?

One potential likely assumption based on the responses taken by the Korean Air is that the owner family members and board members of Korean Air treated the case somewhat lightly, dealing the incident with ‘Et hoc transibit / This, too, shall pass away’ mindset. As the media pointed out earlier, it seems that the owner family didn’t allocate enough attention and resources in obtaining legitimacy to turn the game around. Instead of adopting measures similar to those in precedent case involving Kolon, Korean Air seemed more interested to take ‘easier’ method: how Korean Air itself dealt previously. Korean Air and the owner family apologized few times – move aside whether the receiving audiences considered their attempt as apologies – and remained silent until the case is buried by other issues. This same repertoire occurred for the previous cases; it may be plausible to claim that the top executives considered their choice of response to the case to be a safe call. Only when backfire became noticeably uncontrollable, far beyond their expectation, they started to act more seriously – which was quite late by then. While the economic, societal and importantly legitimacy environment alters along with time, Korean Air decided to maintain their old strategy, only yielding losses.

5.3.2 Lack of concern toward victims’ pragmatic rights

Another example that shows Korean Air’s dangerously complacent attitude towards conducting countermeasures is its poor decision toward the compensation for victims. In this particular section, the main discussion aspect is on pragmatic legitimacy aspects. It is quite interesting how Korean Air assumed the victims who have their rights challenged will remain
silent with, objectively-speaking, ridiculous apology and reward proposals. To the media, such proposals were destined to fail, just at a glance.

In terms of legitimacy defense, even the media showed certain degree of incredulousness since Korean Air’s countermeasures were very questionable, self-righteous in a way and thus amateurish; it’s like as if Korean Air is freely offering its weak spots to the media to attack. Referring to section 4.3, both the first-class passenger during then incident and the chief purser Park claimed they were dumbfounded by Korean Air’s offers. What Korean Air was truly intending may not be known, but one clear matter is that its decision was clearly an exemplary countermeasure to not follow.
6 Conclusion

This final section consists of four subsections. In the first subsection, the research findings are summarized in the light of the research question. Practical implications are dealt in the second subsection. Then, the limitations of the study are discussed in the third section. Last, suggestions for future research will be addressed.

6.1 Research summary

In this subsection, the key results of the research for this paper are to be shown. Primarily, the aim of this paper was to gain an understanding of how corporate legitimacy defense attempt is analyzed and critiqued by the media, with specific context of Korean conglomerate: Chaebol, represented by Korean Air in this case. The study was motivated by personal concern toward constantly occurring communication and legitimacy disasters by Chaebols within Korea. While literatures regarding legitimacy issues of Chaebols’ problematic incidents exist mainly in Korean, those particularly discuss with specific recent case example or those in English are relatively rarer to discover; hence, such circumstance motivated me to conduct this MSc thesis.

The main research question, to assist achieving the aim, was to identify what delegitimization strategies were adopted by the media to challenge Korean Air’s response toward the ‘nut-rage’ incident. To support answering the main research question of the paper, this paper decided to draw upon Suchman (1999) and Scott et al. (2000)’s work when categorizing types of legitimacy to sort strategic media text data. Then, this paper also adopted Van Leewen and Wodak’s work in 1999 and Vaara and Tienari’s work in 2008 regarding critical discourse analysis (CDA) to further specify what strategic tools (authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation, mythopoesis and normalization) were selected to further elaborate on findings. The following table on the next page summarizes it:
Table 2: Summary of delegitimization strategies used by the media for the nut-rage incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy type</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Strategies and characteristics</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorization</td>
<td>Delegitimization conducted by making a reference to indisputable authority.</td>
<td>Criticism toward Cho’s personal traits and the procedural aspects of Korean Air’s countermeasures based on relevant Korean laws</td>
<td>Appendices 5, 6, and 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalization</td>
<td>Delegitimization conducted by referring to utility gained from business knowledge/environment</td>
<td>Criticism on ‘what’ and ‘how’ aspects of Korean Air’s initial countermeasure in comparison to business norm</td>
<td>Appendix 1 three “A” element insisted in Jugan Donga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral evaluation</td>
<td>Delegitimization conducted by emphasizing specific moral values</td>
<td>Criticism based on three specific value systems</td>
<td>Prosecutor’s evidences mentioned in the media. Interview with the chief purser Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normalization</td>
<td>Delegitimization conducted by comparing to precedents</td>
<td>Criticism based on comparison of Korean Air’s countermeasures to how two contrasting precedents have dealt with crisis.</td>
<td>Appendix 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis covered the articles from various Korean media and Korean Air’s corporate defensive accounts as the former’s complementary texts since the incident. The analysis of strategic media text revealed most occurring de-legitimization strategies conducted by the media; the results juxtapose with theoretical models offered by van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), Vaara et al. (2006) and Vaara and Tienari (2008). The result of the findings revealed that the normative legitimacy was the primary focus of the media, with a small proportion of pragmatic challenges; however, no cognitive legitimacy challenges were identified. While the most aspects of CDA strategies were considered by the media, there seems to be greater focus on authorization and moral evaluation aspects, while very few contained mythopoesis element (and therefore not used in this paper). Based on these findings, discussion of:

1) why normative legitimacy texts and challenges were prevalent,
2) why discrepancy between Korean Air’s expectation and results occurred and
3) why certain delegitimization strategies and tools occurred less
were conducted. Based on the findings and discussion, it is clear that the media deemed Korean Air’s responses were undoubtable failure.

I would argue that this paper makes certain contribution to organization and communication studies, leaving number of implications to be noted. First of all, this thesis paper emphasizes the importance of conducting timely, sincere and proper discursive legitimacy when catastrophic incident occurs. Without a doubt, legitimacy is regarded as a key issue for multinational corporations (MNCs) as claimed by Geppert (2003) and Kostova and Zaheer (1999). As most Chaebols are MNCs, there is more than enough reasons for them to be concerned about it; complex organizations like Chaebols are more likely vulnerable whether internally or externally – this incident has demonstrated it quite well. The approach and discussion of findings of this paper gave a concern to the three types of complexity needed when attempting to obtain legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999):

1. the legitimating environment
2. the organization
3. the process of legitimation

The findings section of the paper elaborate on what process of legitimation was taken by Korean Air and how it consequently faced challenges by the media, while the discussion of findings elaborates on how contextual information: the specific legitimating environment of Korea (Chaebol) and the organization (Korean Air) synergizes to result in delegitimization.

Second, this paper focuses on media as a “sensemaking and legitimation arena,” supporting the idea suggested by Vaara et al. (2006). In contemporary society, the media, especially via digital means, rapidly spreads their messages to huge number of audiences, when compared to traditional means of distribution. The media focused on different aspects of delegitimization and sensemaking, notably “production, transmission, and consumption processes” of those (Vaara et al., 2006). As stressed throughout the paper, the media played gigantic role in determining the flow of delegitimization the specific organizational incident: the nut-rage case. The media, as a result, took the initiative in this legitimacy defense /challenge war; Korean Air was dragged around by the media, not being able to assert its claims strongly and convincingly enough against delegitimization in almost every single aspect. Its defensive corporate accounts were by no means as effective as delegitimization texts from the media; they, rather, became subject of further criticism.
6.2 Practical implications

The practical implication from the findings of this paper can be very local-contextual; the ultimate lesson the case and this paper left was to not equate owner family and the company. While nepotism deep within Korean Air is indeed a bigger problem, as it has been resulting in owner family members on executive positions who continuously create headline risks, it could start with a suggestion to urge Chaebols to apply same standard and rules to their owner family members – do not make them seem as if they are on top of the corporate rules and standards. The whole legitimacy issues of this case all rooted from a simple, but commonly agreed by different stakeholders and the media, cause: the owner family within the company being overly powerful, untouched and unchallenged. The fact that ex-vice president Cho returned the airplane for very personal and irrational reason acts against interest of stakeholders in multiple levels. An article from Ohmynews has left straightforward comment, questioning whether the nut problem “was truly sensitive enough to consume 250 other people’s precious time”73 (J. Kim, 2014). A lack of restraining force toward them within Korean Air was indeed a major issue; the following statement sums it up:

“A prime example of what happens when a person with terrible personality obtains high position within an organization, with absolutely no restraining force74,75.”

“A nut goes nuts over nuts. Who would have guessed.”76

Another practical implication to consider is a need to show consistency when conveying apology message to the target audience. This implication is somewhat interrelated with the first implication for this particular case, as often the owner family members become obstacle

73 “땅콩 문제가 250 명의 시간을 점유할 만큼 민감한 문제였나”

74 Hangul: 조직 내에서 인격이 나쁜 사람이 높은 지위를 아무런 견제 없이 가지면 어떻게 되는지를 보여준 사례

75 This phrase is adopted from a survey respondent, who revealed himself as a Korean passport holding 25 years-old, currently employed male. Survey was initially planned as part of data set, but it was decided to not include it at the final stage of this paper.

76 Adopted from Namuwiki (in Korean; https://namu.wiki/w/%EB%82%98%EB%AC%B4%EC%9C%84%ED%82%A4%EB%8C%80%EB%AC%B8). This was a comment from Wall Street Journal online news, with archived evidence saved separately on Namuwiki, as the original link for this specific comment is no longer available:
(https://attachment.namuwikiusercontent.com/%EB%8C%80%ED%95%9C%ED%95%AD%EA%B3%B5%20KE%20%EB%8C%80%ED%95%9C%ED%95%AD%EA%B3%B5%20%EC%9D%B4%EB%A5%99%EC%A7%80%EC%97%B0%20%EC%82%AC%EA%B1%B4_nutsX3.jpg)
to achieve this. Both internal and external communication conducted by Korean Air PR team to seek legitimacy after the incident were not functioning anywhere near how they were intended. The owner family acted contrary to how Korean Air as company has claimed what actions it would take to deal with the case, as mentioned throughout the paper. Until 2018’s protest, the workforce during the then incident feared retaliation if they were to point out her illegitimate (and illegal) behaviors, and the top management including her father, CEO, focused more on covering up legitimacy of her actions and burying the case as silently as possible. Protest, government inspection, and the media coverages of the protest and past incidents are, in a way, retributive justice taking a place. The butterfly effect of delegitimization was consequential; loss of credibility brought huge price to pay for Korean Air, in the end.

Third, this paper contributes to extend our knowledge regarding Korea’s contemporary social phenomena against one of the negative aspects of its corporate culture: Gapjil. Although this phenomenon is not only exclusive to Korea, similar issues in other nations have not been as internationally publicized as the cases in Korea. Although the notion of Gapjil would generally be discussed more with academic papers involving risk management, I believe this paper still enhances our understanding of such phenomena and how the media crucially influences different stakeholders’ sensemaking of it. The knowledge gained from here could potentially be applicable to other nation with similar history of economic growth.

6.3 Limitations of the study

As many papers do, this paper has its own limitations to consider as well. First to consider is that this thesis paper was based on qualitative approach; that is to say, there was no numeral/statistical analysis to follow up for majority of the findings, other than one slight usage in the rationalization section. Although a combination of different approaches (statistics, survey, and so on) was initially planned, the idea was wiped out; considering the nature of the work done in this paper, quantitative method, except perhaps in a very limited manner, would have been very likely unsuitable, resulting in divergence or potentially distortion of topic.

Another limitation to consider is rather narrow scope of focus for the paper: one academically, one practically. The narrow scope of focus in terms of academic concern is use of delegitimization strategy framework based on van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and Vaara
et al. (2006)’s work. The categorization of legitimacy strategies allows more focused analysis but at a cost of missing other potential strategies which may not have been identified yet. The practical side of narrow scope of focus is that this particular paper focuses on one incident: the nut-rage case. As stressed in practical implication, the case is very local-contextually specific to Korean Chaebol; even among various Chaebols, this would be somewhat exceptional. Peculiarity of Korean Air owner family’s repeated Gapjil behaviors for an instance is an outstanding example that represents this context-heavy, narrow and rare case. Thus, the biggest consequential concern, particularly academic purpose wise, is a problem of generalizing results and interpretation of the findings, despite their potential viability.

The analysis of findings eventually discussed the notion of ‘Gapjil’ to elaborate how the media de-legitimized Korean Air’s measures taken. Although equivalent notions existed earlier, this notion has been established and solidified rather recently, resulting in relatively lower number of academic study both in Korean, let alone in English. Further in-depth academic representation of Gapjil as a notion could have helped both this paper and future research with similar subjects.

6.4 Suggestions for future research

This paper focused strategic aspects of the media text, mainly in terms of delegitimization; eventually, corporate defense account became complementary resources to support the strategic media text. I believe, however, future studies involving similar case or topic can also utilize legitimization tactics conducted by defensive corporate accounts. Future research can be conducted via sole use of defensive corporate accounts or perhaps even comparison of both legitimization and delegitimization tactics by respective sides, which I would imagine it can potentially demonstrate bigger picture to understand both legitimization and delegitimization process.

Another suggestion is to consider data dealing with multimodal communication means, not limiting strategic data options to solely media texts. Although multimodality means more variables to consider, complicating analysis and potentially distorting cause-and-effects, it can also provide more interesting findings of implications of strategic media texts. More and more media tend to use visual and audio communications to strengthen their delegitimization arguments, which can then bring greater room for micro-level rhetorical approach, which this paper was not able to provide much. As an example of micro level rhetorical approach, in-
depth linguistic analysis of strategic media text – namely analysis of lexical choices, overall tone, poses, visual cue and so on – could have been beneficial to gain greater extent of knowledge associated with the media’s delegitimization strategies in the incidents like this, for an instance.
7 References:


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[‘The nut-return’ case: Cho Hyun-ah has been released after 143 days in a jail… she is put on probation/granted a stay of execution in the second trial]. Yonhap News. Retrieved from http://news.nate.com/view/20150522n14788


Appendix

Appendix 1: Korean Air’s ‘statement of stance’ released to the media (2014 December 8th; translation added in the bracket right to the original statement)77

‘1. 승객분들께 불편을 끼쳐드려 사과 드립니다. (We would like to apologize for the passengers of the inconvenience that we caused)

○ 비상 상황이 아니었음에도 불구하고 항공기가 다시 제자리로 돌아와 승무원을 하기시킨 점은 지나친 행동이었으며, 이로 인해 승객 분들께 불편을 끼쳐드려 사과드립니다 (We Korean Air)78 apologizes to our passengers for the inconvenience caused by the return of the aircraft, as it was an immoderation, even though the circumstance was not an emergency).

○ 당시 항공기는 탑승교로부터 10 미터도 이동하지 않은 상태로, 항공기 안전에는 문제가 없었습니다 (At that particular moment, the aircraft has moved less than 10 meters from the boarding bridge, and thus not negatively influencing aircraft safety.)

2. 대한항공 임원들은 항공기 탑승 시 기내 서비스와 안전에 대한 점검의 의무가 있습니다. (The executives of Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services and security concerns when they are on the flight)

○ 사무장을 하기시킨 이유는 최고 서비스와 안전을 추구해야 할 사무장이 (The reason why we ejected our cabin crew chief, who is supposed to pursue best service and security, is: )

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77 Retrieved from: The Huffington Post Korea, whom cited their original source as Joongang Ilbo; http://www.huffingtonpost.kr/2014/12/08/story_n_6287626.html

78 In original Korean, there was no subject at all, as a part of evasive language tactics.
1) 담당 부사장의 지적에도 불구하고 규정과 절차를 무시했다는 점 (1. He has ignored the Korean Air regulation and associated procedures, despite the the ex-vice president Cho’s warning)

2) 매뉴얼조차 제대로 사용하지 못하고 변명과 거짓으로 적당히 둘러댔다는 점을 들어 조 부사장이 사무장의 자질을 문제 삼았고, 기장이 하기 조치한 것입니다. (2. He concocted an excuse for violating Korean Air manual, let alone not being able to properly utilize it; the the ex-vice president Cho has problematized his behavior and qualification, and thus resulted in aircraft captain to eject Park from the plane)

○ 대한항공 전 임원들은 항공기 탑승 시 기내 서비스와 안전에 대한 점검 의무가 있습니다. 조현아 부사장은 기내 서비스와 기내식을 책임지고 있는 임원으로서 문제 제기 및 지적은 당연한 일입니다. (The executives of Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services and security concerns when they are on the flight. It is natural and reasonable for the the ex-vice president Cho Hyun-ah, an executive who is responsible for in-flight services and meals, to point out and problematize seemingly troublesome conducts.

3. 철저한 교육을 통해 서비스 질을 높이겠습니다. (We will make sure to raise the quality of our service via thorough training.)

○ 대한항공은 이번 일을 계기로 승무원 교육을 더욱 강화해 대 고객 서비스 및 안전 제고에 만전을 기하겠습니다. (We, Korean Air, will make sure to improve our customer service and safety concerns via thorough training of our flight attendants.)
Appendix 2 Public apology and question-and-answer from Cho Yang-ho, the chairman of Korean Air and Hanjin group at press conference.

Adopted from Hankyoreh (M. Kim, 2014):^79

제여식의여리석은행동으로큰물의를일으킨데대해진심으로사죄드립니다/
I would like to sincerely apologize for my daughter’s foolish misbehavior that caused massive public criticism.

dahanhangong회장으로서,또한조현아의애비로서국민여러분의너그러운용서를
As the chairman of Korean Air, and also as a father of Cho, Hyun-ah, I would like to ask for the public’s generous forgiveness. Scold me rather; it is my fault.

국토부와검찰의조사결과와상관없이조현아를대한항공부사장직은물론계열사등기이사와계열사대표등그룹내모든자리에서물러나도록
Regardless of investigation results from the prosecution and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, Cho, Hyun-ah will be resigned from her current positions: affiliate representative, affiliate director of the board and needless to say, Korean Air vice-president.

다시한번사죄의말씀을드리며,국민여러분의용서를구합니다./Once again, I apologize, and beg your pardon.

Question-and-answer:

- 사과가늦어진이유는뭘니까?/-Why has apology been delayed so long?

“변명하지않겠습니다.죄송합니다”/“I will not give excuse about that. I apologize.”

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^79 Also, take a look at video uploaded by the Kyunghyang TV, associated with a report from Kyunghyang news; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lft0G0tgO1fU
- 이번 사건이 왜 일어났다고 보십니까? / - What is your view on why this incident occurred?

“제가 교육을 잘못시킨 것 같아 죄송합니다” / “I apologize for that I have raised her wrong.”

- 조 전 부사장이 다시 복귀합니까? / - Will the ex-vice president Cho return to her work?

“경영 복귀는 아직 생각해 본 적이 없습니다” / “I have not thought about whether she will be back for the management.”

- 고객서비스 매뉴얼을 개선할 계획은 없습니까? / - Do you intend to modify current customer service manual?

“고객서비스 매뉴얼은 지금껏 잘못된 게 없다고 생각하나 잘못된 게 있다면 고쳐나가겠습니다.” / “I do not think there is anything wrong with the current manual so far, but will do so if there is anything wrong with it.”

- 평창동계올림픽 조직위원장직을 계속 맡으실 건가요? / - Will you continue to be in charge of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, as a chairperson?

“조직위원장 자리가 공적인 자리인 만큼 혼자 결정할 수 없는 상황이어서 올림픽에 도움에 방향으로 결정하겠습니다.” / “As the position of the chairperson is rather public, I cannot determine that in my own. I will coordinate the matter in a way beneficial to the Winter Olympics.”
Appendix 3: Korean Air’s apology advertisement in the major news (2014 December 16th; translation below the photo)

Translation, following original’s format:

(We Korean Air) feel keenly any word of apology is not sufficient at this point.

Recent incidents of Korean Air have failed people with indescribable disappointment (We) have affronted you who have been showing great love (toward us).

(we are) aware that any word of apology is not sufficient.

Hence so,

(we) will keep your reprimand and reproof deep in our heart.

(We) will try our best to turn over a leaf and become a beloved and trustworthy Korean Air once again

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80 Photo adopted from: Chosun Biz (http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/12/16/2014121603104.html)
(We) will become new Korean Air

Korean Air
Appendix 4: Kolon Industry Inc’s public apology distributed to Korean media

Jpg version:
http://menu.mt.co.kr/moneyweek/thumb/2014/02/18/06/2014021808538064847_1.jpg

We bow down (to all involved stakeholders) and sincerely apologize.

We reluctantly apologize. / (We) bow down (to all involved stakeholders) and sincerely apologize.

We sincerely pray for the repose of the deceased and apologize to the bereaved.

We feel heavily responsible for the loss of young lives, who were to start their college life. Our deepest sympathy and apology to those who are filled with deep sadness.

We also sincerely apologize to those who were injured from the incident, and to their family members. We wish them to recover fast, and we would not hesitate to support them with all possible means.

We feel our responsibility
keenly regarding the case, as it gave the public occasion to feel anxiety. Kolon has established an emergency headquarters to deal with the incident, and we will do our best to save life. We will also show our best effort to investigate on the cause of the incident.

다시 한 번 고인과 유가족, 부상을 입으신 분들을 비롯한 모든 분들께 사죄를 드립니다. / Once again, we sincerely apologize to deceased, bereaved and to all other relevant individuals.

-코오롱그룹 이웅열 회장 및 임직원 일동 / Chairman Lee, Woong-yeol and all executive staffs
Appendix 5: Partial collection of relevant Korean Aviation Safety and Security Act\textsuperscript{81} associated with this case, which particularly works against Cho Hyun-ah’s legitimacy defense.

항공보안법 / AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY ACT


제 2 조(정의) / Article 2 (Definitions)

이 법에서 사용하는 용어의 뜻은 다음과 같다. 다만, 이 법에 특별한 규정이 있는 것을 제외하고는 「항공법」에서 정하는 바에 따른다. /The terms used in this Act shall be defined as follows: Provided, That those not specially prescribed in this Act shall be as prescribed by the Aviation Act:  

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. "운항중"이란 승객이 탑승한 후 항공기의 모든 문이 닫힌 때부터 내리기 위하여 문을 열 때까지를 말한다 / 1. The term "in flight" means from the time all the doors of an airplane close after passengers aboard the airplane until the time all the doors of the airplane open for passengers to disembark;)
\end{itemize}

제 23 조(승객의 협조의무) / Article 23 (Obligations of Passengers to Cooperate)

① 항공기 내에 있는 승객은 항공기와 승객의 안전한 운항과 여행을 위하여 다음 각 호의 어느 하나에 해당하는 행위를 하여서는 아니 된다.  

\textsuperscript{81} Adopted from national law information center;

Korean: http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsSeq=150098#0000

English translation: http://www.law.go.kr/eng/engLsSc.do?menuId=1&query=aviation&x=0&y=0#liBgc019
(1) No passenger on board shall engage in any of the following acts to ensure the safe flight of an airplane and travel of passengers:  <Amended by Act No. 11932, Jul. 16, 2013>

1. 폭언, 고성방가 등 소란행위 / 1. Making a noise, such as abusive language, loud singing;

2. 흡연(흡연구역에서의 흡연은 제외한다) / 2. Smoking (excluding smoking in a smoking zone);

3. 술을 마시거나 약물을 복용하고 다른 사람에게 위해를 주는 행위 / 3. Doing harm to other persons after drinking alcohol or taking drug;

4. 다른 사람에게 성적(性的) 수치심을 일으키는 행위 / 4. Causing sexual humiliation to others;

5. 「항공법」제61 조의 2를 위반하여 전자기기를 사용하는 행위 / 5. Using electronic equipment, in violation of Article 61-2 of the Aviation Act;

6. 기장의 승낙 없이 조종실 출입을 기도하는 행위 / 6. Attempting to enter the cockpit without the captain's consent;

7. 기장등의 업무를 위계 또는 위력으로써 방해하는 행위 / 7. Obstructing the duties of the captain, etc. by a deceptive plan or power.

② 승객은 항공기의 보안이나 운항을 저해하는 폭행 · 협박 · 위계행위(危計行爲)를 하거나 출입문 · 탈출구 · 기기의 조작을 하여서는 아니 된다. <개정 2013.4.5.> / (2) No passenger shall attack, threaten, engage in deception or handle the entrance, emergency exit and devices, which hinder the security and flight of the airplane.  <Amended by Act No. 11753, Apr. 5, 2013>

③ 승객은 항공기가 착륙한 후 항공기에서 내리지 아니하고 항공기를 점거하거나 항공기 내에서 놓성하여서는 아니 된다. / (3) No passenger shall occupy the airplane
and stage a sit-down demonstration on the airplane without disembarking the airplane after the airplane lands.

제 42 조 (항공기 항로 변경죄) / Article 42 (Crime of Altering Course of Airplane)

위계 또는 위력으로써 운항중인 항공기의 항로를 변경하게 하여 정상 운항을 방해한 사람은 1년 이상 10년 이하의 징역에 처한다. [전문개정 2010.3.22.] / Any person who impedes the normal flight of an airplane by forcing the airplane in flight to alter course by a deceptive plan or power shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year but not more than ten years. [This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10160, Mar. 22, 2010]

제 43 조 (직무집행방해죄) / Article 43 (Crime of Interference in Execution of Duties)

폭행ㆍ협박 또는 위계로써 기장등의 정당한 직무집행을 방해하여 항공기와 승객의 안전을 해친 사람은 10년 이하의 징역에 처한다. [전문개정 2010.3.22.] / Any person who harms the safety of an airplane and its passengers by interference in the legitimate execution of duties of the captain, etc. by violence, intimidation or a deceptive plan shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years. [This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10160, Mar. 22, 2010]

제 46 조 (항공기 안전운항 저해 폭행죄 등) / Article 46 (Crime of Violence, etc. Impeding Safe Flight of Aircraft)

제 23 조 제 2 항을 위반한 사람은 5년 이하의 징역에 처한다. [전문개정 2010.3.22.] / Any person who violates Article 23 (2) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years. [This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10160, Mar. 22, 2010]

제 50 조 (벌칙) / Article 50 (Penalty Provisions)

② 다음 각 호의 어느 하나에 해당하는 자는 500 만원 이하의 벌금에 처한다. <개정 2013.4.5., 2013.7.16.> / (2) Any of the following persons shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five million won: <Amended by Act No. 11753, Apr. 5, 2013; Act No. 11932, Jul. 16, 2013>
3. 기장등의 사전 경고에도 불구하고 운항 중인 항공기 내에서

제23 조제1 항제1 호부터 제5 호까지 및 제7 호에 따른 위반행위를 한 사람 / 3.

A person who commits an offense under Article 23 (1) 1 through 5 and 7 on the airplane in flight despite a prior warning of the captain, etc.;
Appendix 6: Partial Collection of relevant Korean Aviation Act⁸²

항공법 / AVIATION ACT


제 50 조(기장의 권한 등) / Article 50 (Authority, etc. of Plane Captain)

① 항공기의 비행 안전에 대하여 책임을 지는 사람(이하 "기장"이라 한다)은 그 항공기의 승무원을 지휘·감독한다. / (1) Each person responsible for the flight safety of an aircraft (hereinafter referred to as "plane captain") shall direct and supervise the crew of the aircraft.

② 기장은 국토교통부령으로 정하는 바에 따라 항공기의 운항에 필요한 준비가 끝난 것을 확인한 후가 아니면 항공기를 출발시켜서는 아니 된다. <개정 2013.3.23.> / (2) No plane captain shall take off without confirming whether the aircraft is completely prepared for operation, as prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. <Amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013>

③ 기장은 항공기나 여객에 위난(危難)이 발생하였거나 발생할 우려가 있다고 인정될 때에는 항공기에 있는 여객에게 피난방법과 그 밖에 안전에 관하여 필요한 사항을 명할 수 있다. / (3) If an aircraft or any of its passengers encounter or are anticipated to encounter danger, the plane captain may order passengers on board the aircraft to evacuate from the aircraft as directed or take other necessary safety measures.

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⁸² Korean:
http://www.law.go.kr/lsSc.do?menuId=0&p1=&subMenu=1&nwYn=1&section=&tabNo=&query=%ED%95%AD%EA%B3%B5%EB%B2%95#undefined

English translation:
http://www.law.go.kr/eng/engLsSc.do?menuId=1&query=aviation+chief&x=0&y=0#liBgcolor0
④ 기장은 항행 중 그 항공기에 위난이 발생하였을 때에는 여객을 구조하고, 지상 또는 수상(水上)에 있는 사람이나 물건에 대한 위난 방지에 필요한 수단을 마련하여야 하며, 여객과 그 밖에 항공기에 있는 사람을 그 항공기에서 나가게 한 후가 아니면 항공기를 떠나서는 아니 된다./
(4) If an aircraft encounters danger during flight, the plane captain shall take measures necessary to rescue passengers and prevent danger to persons or things on land or water, and shall not leave the aircraft unless he/she has taken measures to ensure the passengers and other persons on board have left the aircraft.

⑤ 기장은 항공기사고, 항공기준사고 또는 항공안전장애가 발생하였을 때에는 국토교통부령으로 정하는 바에 따라 국토교통부장관에게 그 사실을 보고하여야 한다. 다만, 기장이 보고할 수 없는 경우에는 그 항공기의 소유자등이 보고를 하여야 한다.  <개정 2013.3.23.>
(5) If an aircraft accident, aircraft incident, or aviation safety hindrance occurs, the plane captain shall report it to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, as prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport: Provided, That if the plane captain is unable to make the report, the owner, etc. of the aircraft shall report it.  <Amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013>

⑥ 기장은 다른 항공기에서 항공기사고, 항공기준사고 또는 항공안전장애가 발생한 것을 알았을 때에는 국토교통부령으로 정하는 바에 따라 국토교통부장관에게 그 사실을 보고하여야 한다. 다만, 무선설비를 통하여 그 사실을 안 경우에는 그러하지 아니하다.  <개정 2013.3.23.>
(6) If a plane captain discovers that another aircraft has had an aircraft accident, aircraft incident or aviation safety hindrance, he/she shall report it to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, as prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport: Provided, That this shall not apply where the fact is found through wireless apparatus.  <Amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013>
[전문개정 2009.6.9.] / [This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 9780, Jun. 9, 2009]
Appendix 7: Partial collection of relevant Criminal Act

형법 / CRIMINAL ACT^83

제 34 장 신용, 업무와 경매에 관한 죄 / CHAPTER XXXIV CRIMES AGAINST CREDIT, BUSINESS AND AUCTION

제 314 조(업무방해) / Article 314 (Interference with Business)

① 제 313 조의 방법 또는 위력으로써 사람의 업무를 방해한 자는 5 년 이하의 징역 또는 1 천 500 만원 이하의 벌금에 처한다. <개정 1995.12.29.> / (1) A person who interferes with the business of another by the method of Article 313 or by the threat of force, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding fifteen million won. <Amended by Act No. 5057, Dec. 29, 1995>

② 컴퓨터등 정보처리장치 또는 전자기록등 특수매체기록을 손괴하거나 정보처리장치에 허위의 정보 또는 부정한 명령을 입력하거나 기타 방법으로 정보처리에 장애를 발생하게 하여 사람의 업무를 방해한 자도 제 1 항의 형과 같다. <신설 1995.12.29.> / (2) Any person who interferes with another person's business by damaging or destroying any data processor, such as computer, or special media records, such as electromagnetic records, or inputting false information or improper order into the data processor, or making any impediment in processing any data by other way, shall also be subject to the same punishment as referred to in paragraph (1). <Newly Inserted by Act No. 5057, Dec. 29, 1995>

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^83 Korean: http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=183536&ancYd=20160529&efYd=20160529&ancNo=14178#AJAX

English translation: http://www.law.go.kr/eng/engLsSc.do?menuId=1&query=criminal+act&x=0&y=0#liBcolor30
제 37 장 권리행사를 방해하는 죄 / CHAPTER XXXVII CRIMES OF OBSTRUCTING ANOTHER FROM EXERCISING HIS RIGHT

제 324 조(강요) / Article 324 (Coercion)

폭행 또는 협박으로 사람의 권리행사를 방해하거나 의무없는 일을 하게 한 자는 5 년 이하의 징역 또는 3 천만원 이하의 벌금에 처한다. <개정 1995.12.29., 2016.1.6.> / A person who obstructs another from exercising his right by violence or intimidation, or coerces one to do any unobliged work, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years. <Amended by Act No. 5057, Dec. 29, 1995>