The Unthinkable Conclusion : Derek Parfit’s Budding Antinatalism

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Volume Title

A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä

Date

2024-10-30

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en

Pages

10

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Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, pp. 1-10

Abstract

Derek Parfit famously opined that causing a person to exist with a life barely worth living can be wrong, although it is not wrong for that person. This conundrum is known as the nonidentity problem. Parfit also held that persons can, in a morally relevant sense, be caused to exist in the distant future by actions that make the agent a necessary condition for a person’s existence. When these views are combined, which he did, and applied explicitly to persons with a life not worth living, which he did not, an interesting conditional conclusion can be drawn. If every family line eventually produces a person with a life not worth living, and if causing that person to exist cannot be justified by the benefits befalling others in the family line, it is always wrong to have children. Parfit did not draw this antinatalist conclusion, but an analysis of his introduction of the nonidentity problem shows that he could have. Since Parfit’s other views on population ethics continue to be discussed with relative respect, it stands to reason that the antinatalist position should be no exception. Right or wrong, it has its legitimate place in considerations concerning the future of reproduction.

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Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), 2024.

Keywords

antinatalism, Derek Parfit, human extinction, nonidentity problem, population ethics

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Citation

Häyry, M 2024, ' The Unthinkable Conclusion : Derek Parfit’s Budding Antinatalism ', Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, pp. 1-10 . https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180124000483