Roe v. Wade and the Predatory State Interest in Protecting Future Cannon Fodder
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A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä
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2023-07-01
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en
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9
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Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Volume 32, issue 3, pp. 434-442
Abstract
The reversal of Roe v. Wade by the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the states to regulate terminations of pregnancy more autonomously than during 1973–2022. Those who think that women should be legally entitled to abortions at their own request are suggesting that annulling the reversal could be an option. This would mean continued reliance on the interpretation of privacy that Roe v. Wade stood on. The interpretation does not have the moral support that its supporters think. This can be shown by recalling the shortcomings of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous violinist example and its application to abortion laws. Philosophically better reasons for not restricting access to abortion can be found in a simple principle of fairness and in sensible theories on the value of human life. Whether or not philosophy has any use in the debate is another matter. Legal decisions to regulate terminations are probably based on pronatalist state interests, shared by the apparently disagreeing parties and immune to rational argumentation.Description
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abortion, Roe v. Wade, Dobbs v. Jackson, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Finnish abortion law, fairness
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Citation
Häyry, M 2023, ' Roe v. Wade and the Predatory State Interest in Protecting Future Cannon Fodder ', Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 434-442 . https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180122000342