Affine equations as dynamic variables to obtain economic equilibria

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dc.contributorAalto-yliopistofi
dc.contributorAalto Universityen
dc.contributor.authorKitti, Mitri 
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Engineering Physics and Mathematicsen
dc.contributor.departmentTeknillisen fysiikan ja matematiikan osastofi
dc.contributor.labSystems Analysis Laboratoryen
dc.contributor.labSysteemianalyysin laboratoriofi
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-17T07:29:42Z
dc.date.available2012-02-17T07:29:42Z
dc.date.issued2006-02-10 
dc.description.abstractThis thesis studies how economic equilibria can be reached with limited information by adjusting affine equations, and how collusion in oligopolistic markets can be maintained with affine reaction strategies. The first question is considered for exchange economies, contracting problems, and a two-party negotiation support method. The main contributions are new ways to reach and maintain equilibria. For exchange economies the thesis shows that a modification of fixed-point iteration converges globally under conditions that are remarkably close to those required for the continuous time tâtonnement process presented by Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz. For the constraint proposal method for two-party negotiations this thesis provides answers for three major questions: does the method produce Pareto-optimal points, does it lead to a problem that has a solution, and can the solutions be found with fixed-point iteration. The thesis also shows that the complete information equilibrium of a contract design problem can be reached by adjusting the contract with fixed-point iteration. Finally, the thesis formulates a simple dynamic counterpart of a static reaction strategy by D. K. Osborne in a repeated oligopoly game with discounting. It is proven that these strategies lead to a subgame perfect equilibrium when the possible deviations are bounded and the proportional reaction strategies have sufficiently large slopes.en
dc.description.versionrevieweden
dc.format.extent123 
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf 
dc.identifier.isbn951-22-8023-X 
dc.identifier.issn0782-2030 
dc.identifier.urihttps://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/2661
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:fi:tkk-006487 
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherHelsinki University of Technologyen
dc.publisherTeknillinen korkeakoulufi
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSystems Analysis Laboratory research reports. Aen
dc.relation.ispartofseries94en
dc.subject.keywordexchange economiesen
dc.subject.keywordtâtonnementen
dc.subject.keywordnegotiation supporten
dc.subject.keywordcontract designen
dc.subject.keywordfixed-point iterationen
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen
dc.subject.keywordoligopolyen
dc.subject.keywordsubgame perfectionen
dc.subject.otherEconomicsen
dc.subject.otherMathematicsen
dc.titleAffine equations as dynamic variables to obtain economic equilibriaen
dc.typeG4 Monografiaväitöskirjafi
dc.type.dcmitypetexten
dc.type.ontasotVäitöskirja (monografia)fi
dc.type.ontasotDoctoral dissertation (monograph)en
local.aalto.digiauthask
local.aalto.digifolderAalto_66882
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