Signaling and countersignaling

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bachelor_Häkkinen_Aaro_2018.pdf (531.46 KB)

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School of Business | Bachelor's thesis
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Date

2018

Department

Taloustieteen laitos

Major/Subject

Mcode

Degree programme

Taloustiede

Language

en

Pages

12

Series

Abstract

Signaling is relevant for markets and games with incomplete information, and it occurs when a player believes he can improve his payoff by a decision to signal. In order to study signaling games, it is meaningful to seek possible equilibria. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a solution concept that can be used for this. Related to strategies of players, countersignaling is a phenomenon in which a player of higher quality invests less in signals than a player of lower quality. This kind of equilibrium requires an existence of additional noisy information that can change the interpretation of signals.

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Thesis advisor

Mustonen, Mikko

Keywords

signaling, countersignaling, game theory, perfect Bayesian equilibrium

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https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:aalto-201904212640

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[kand] Kauppakorkeakoulu / BIZ (Open Access)