Use of auctions in spectrum awards

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School of Business | Master's thesis
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Date

2016

Department

Taloustieteen laitos
Department of Economics

Major/Subject

Kansantaloustiede
Economics

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Degree programme

Language

en

Pages

68

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Abstract

In my thesis I explore how to best award spectrum licenses to mobile network operators. During the last twenty years governments have shifted their preferred method of awarding spectrum from comparative awards to auctions. The praised VCG mechanism does not apply well to auctioning spectrum and instead simultaneous multiple round auction, clock auction, and combinatorial clock auction models are used. These models have flaws causing bidders to lack an unambiguous dominant strategy and practice demand reduction. Each spectrum auction is different and there exists no one-size-fits-all solution. Thus, the auction design process carries tremendous weight when attempting to organize a successful spectrum award.

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Keywords

spectrum awards, spectrum auctions, mechanism design, VCG mechanism, multi-unit auction, simultaneous ascending auction, combinatorial clock auction

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https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:aalto-201801181130

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[gradu] Kauppakorkeakoulu / BIZ