Pricing Sponsored Data Plans in Two-Sided Markets
Loading...
URL
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
School of Business |
Master's thesis
Unless otherwise stated, all rights belong to the author. You may download, display and print this publication for Your own personal use. Commercial use is prohibited.
Authors
Date
2018
Department
Major/Subject
Mcode
Degree programme
Economics
Language
en
Pages
63 + 4
Series
Abstract
This thesis shows that a monopoly Internet Service Provider will never offer zero-rated mobile data plans for homogenous consumers if it cannot ask content providers to pay for the traffic increase caused by to zero-rating. Increasing the data allowance will result in similar utility gains for the customers than zero-rating some content, with lower or identical costs for the Internet Service Provider. When a monopoly Internet Service Provider is allowed to collect payments from content providers, prices to both sides of the market are determined by the size of the data allowance. Opposing effects of distorted consumption towards the zero-rated content and increased total consumption of data mean that total welfare effects remain ambiguous and depend on the parameter values.Description
Thesis advisor
Välimäki, JuusoMustonen, Mikko
Keywords
zero-rating, sponsored data, two-sided pricing, net neutrality