What are the priorities of bureaucrats? Evidence from conjoint experiments with procurement officials

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openAccess

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Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä

Date

2024-11

Department

School Common, BIZ
Department of Economics

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Mcode

Degree programme

Language

en

Pages

18

Series

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume 227, pp. 1-18

Abstract

While effective bureaucracy is crucial for state capacity, its decision-making remains a black box. We elicit preferences of 900+ real-world public procurement officials in Finland and Germany. This is an important pursuit as they report having sizeable discretion and minimal extrinsic incentives. Through conjoint experiments, we identify the relative importance of multiple features of procurement outcomes. Officials prioritize avoiding unexpectedly high prices over seeking low prices. Avoiding winners with prior bad performance is the most important feature. Officials avoid very low competition, while litigation risks and regional favoritism matter less. Preferences and office interests appear well-aligned among bureaucrats.

Description

Publisher Copyright: © 2024 The Author(s)

Keywords

Bureaucrats, Conjoint experiments, Preferences, Public procurement

Other note

Citation

Tukiainen, J, Blesse, S, Bohne, A, Giuffrida, L M, Jääskeläinen, J, Luukinen, A & Sieppi, A 2024, ' What are the priorities of bureaucrats? Evidence from conjoint experiments with procurement officials ', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 227, 106716, pp. 1-18 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106716