Protecting the stack with PACed canaries
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This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive Version of Record was published in SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada https://doi.org/10.1145/3342559.3365336
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A4 Artikkeli konferenssijulkaisussa
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Date
2019-10-27
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Mcode
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en
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SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada
Abstract
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protec- tion with minimal performance overhead.Description
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Liljestrand, H, Gauhar, Z, Nyman, T, Ekberg, J-E & Asokan, N 2019, Protecting the stack with PACed canaries . in SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada . ACM, Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution, Huntsville, Canada, 27/10/2019 . https://doi.org/10.1145/3342559.3365336