Protecting the stack with PACed canaries

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Conference article in proceedings
Date
2019-10-27
Major/Subject
Mcode
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Language
en
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SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada
Abstract
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protec- tion with minimal performance overhead.
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Citation
Liljestrand , H , Gauhar , Z , Nyman , T , Ekberg , J-E & Asokan , N 2019 , Protecting the stack with PACed canaries . in SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada . ACM , Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution , Huntsville , Canada , 27/10/2019 . https://doi.org/10.1145/3342559.3365336