Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders

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A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä
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Date

2017-05-01

Department

Department of Economics

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Language

en

Pages

12

Series

Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 169, pp. 629-640

Abstract

This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5% of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes.

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Keywords

All-pay auction, Large auctions

Other note

DOI

10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008

Citation

Murto, P & Välimäki, J 2017, 'Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 169, pp. 629-640. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008

Permanent link to this item

https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:aalto-201812105911

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[article-cris] Kauppakorkeakoulu / BIZ