Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders

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Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä
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Author
Date
2017-05-01
Department
Department of Economics
Major/Subject
Mcode
Degree programme
Language
en
Pages
12
629-640
Series
Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 169
Abstract
This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5% of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes.
Description
Keywords
All-pay auction, Large auctions
Other note
DOI
10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008
Citation
Murto, P & Välimäki, J 2017, ' Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders ', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 169, pp. 629-640 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008
Permanent link to this item
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:aalto-201812105911
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[article-cris] Kauppakorkeakoulu / BIZ