Global games approach in analysis of currency attacks
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School of Business |
Bachelor's thesis
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Authors
Date
2022
Department
Major/Subject
Mcode
Degree programme
Bachelor’s programme in Economics
Language
en
Pages
27+1
Series
Abstract
In this thesis we present a theoretical model of a speculative currency attack as a game of incomplete information between individual speculators deciding whether to attack a currency. Most often such situations are modelled assuming common knowledge of the state of the economy, resulting in a multiplicity of equilibria. We show that if the speculators observe noisy signals of the state of the economy, the multiplicity of equilibria simplifies to one unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The global games framework was established for analyzing such equilibrium selection in different economic applications. Depending on the state of the economy, the actions of the mass of speculators and the cost and value of maintaining the fixed exchange rate, the monetary authority may have to abandon the currency peg, inducing a currency crisis. A static, binary-action, currency attack model with incomplete information is a step towards being able to analyze policy solutions that may help prevent currency crises.Description
Thesis advisor
Kitti, MitriKeywords
global games, currency attack, common knowledge, incomplete information