David Bohm’s philosophy of science in his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics

Abstract

The paper investigates David Bohm’s philosophy of science as a form of fallibilist realism that underpins his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics Bohm (Physical Review, 85, 166–179, 1952a); (Physical Review, 85, 180–193, 1952b); (Foundations of Physics, 14, 255–274, 1984); (A realist view of quantum theory. In A. van der Merwe, F. Selleri, & G. Tarozzi (Eds.), Microphysical reality and quantum formalism (Vol. 2, pp. 3–18, 1988); (Meaning and information. In P. Pylkkänen (Ed.), The search for meaning: The new spirit in science and philosophy (pp. 43–85, 1989); (Philosophical Psychology, 3, 271–286, 1990); Bohm and Hiley (Foundations of Physics, 5, 93–109, 1975); (Foundations of Physics, 14, 255–274, 1984); (The undivided universe: An ontological interpretation of quantum theory. Routledge, 1993). Bohm’s central aim is to establish the superiority of his interpretation over the standard Copenhagen framework, particularly in contrast to that of Niels Bohr. Whereas Bohr asserts that knowledge of quantum phenomena is restricted to the statistical outcomes of measurement, Bohm’s approach is distinctly realist in orientation. Responding to the challenges posed by Einstein and other physicists, Bohm relies on extra-empirical criteria such as determinism, objectivity and intelligibility. The paper develops what will be termed the methodology of intuitive intelligibility (II), consisting of four stages: (1) reformulation of the standard quantum equations, (2) physical interpretation of the mathematical symbols, (3) drawing analogies with classical laws, and (4) drawing analogies with common experience. It is argued that Bohm applies the (II) methodology consistently, with the notable exception of the ontological status of the wave function and quantum potential. In attempting to explain causal relations from a 3 N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the number of particles) to familiar three-dimensional space through an appeal to ‘information’, Bohm arguably commits a category mistake. A proposed resolution - drawing on Bohm’s own holistic analogies - is supported by the recent multi-field interpretation (Romano Multi-field and Bohm’s theory. Synthese, 198(30), 10587–10609, 2021). The term fallibilist realism aptly characterizes Bohm’s stance in the philosophy of science: he repeatedly emphasizes that the causal interpretation is not intended as a final theory. Nevertheless, holism constitutes a substantive ontological commitment that he is unwilling to abandon.