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Platform governance, value capture, and bargaining power in the streaming-era entertainment value chain
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School of Business |
Bachelor's thesis
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en
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51 + 5
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The governance of multinational streaming platforms affects the amount of money that creators earn in the streaming-era. A five-dimensional conceptual model was developed to examine platform governance mechanisms affecting value capture and bargaining power within the streaming-era entertainment value chain. The conceptual model includes five dimensions: platform governance mechanisms, control points, opacity mechanisms, value capture, and bargaining power. The conceptual model was tested using a qualitative dyadic case-study analysis of the relationship between Rabbit Films and Netflix. Data for this research included primary data collected through a semi-structured interview. Secondary data collected from fourteen document sources were used to verify findings from interviews. The results indicate that value capture is highly concentrated among platforms due to the ability of platforms to acquire worldwide rights to intellectual property; limit producers' earnings through fully funded production budgets that cap profit margins; use exclusive bundling arrangements that eliminate competing distributors and therefore restrict competition; and maintain significant levels of data opacity. As such, this thesis provides a theoretically integrated explanation of how platform governance affects bargaining power and introduces an alternative regulatory approach that views regulatory intervention as an integral aspect of shaping bargaining power.