aalto1 untyped-item.component.html
Axiological Values Grounded in Basic Motivational Dispositions: How to Be a Subjectivist about Meaning in Life
Loading...
Access rights
openAccess
publishedVersion
URL
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä
This publication is imported from Aalto University research portal.
View publication in the Research portal (opens in new window)
View/Open full text file from the Research portal (opens in new window)
Other link related to publication (opens in new window)
View publication in the Research portal (opens in new window)
View/Open full text file from the Research portal (opens in new window)
Other link related to publication (opens in new window)
Unless otherwise stated, all rights belong to the author. You may download, display and print this publication for Your own personal use. Commercial use is prohibited.
Authors
Date
Major/Subject
Mcode
Degree programme
Language
en
Pages
Series
Journal of Philosophy of Life, Volume 12, issue 1, pp. 55-76
Abstract
Subjectivism as regards meaningfulness has fallen out of fashion due to certain highly counterintuitive implications. The present account aims to revive subjectivism by proposing a distinction between consciously chosen axiological values such as meaningfulness and more implicit proto-values that are part of our human nature. As regards the latter, the present account focuses especially on evolved basic motivational dispositions to seek out certain psychosocial experiences, which have been the subject of much research within empirical psychology. Instead of being connected to fleeting desires, it is argued that meaningfulness should be grounded in one specific basic motivational disposition – the disposition to do good to others – that helps to explain why meaningfulness is typically seen as intuitively appealing and an independent basis of value. Meaningfulness, in this account, isn’t mind independent, but it is still conscious-mind independent, which helps this version of subjectivism to avoid the typical counterarguments against subjectivism, while retaining many qualities typically only associated with objectivism.
Description
Keywords
Other note
Citation
Martela, F 2022, 'Axiological Values Grounded in Basic Motivational Dispositions: How to Be a Subjectivist about Meaning in Life', Journal of Philosophy of Life, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 55-76. < https://www.philosophyoflife.org/202204.html >