Investment Incentives in Competitive Electricity Markets

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dc.contributorAalto-yliopistofi
dc.contributorAalto Universityen
dc.contributor.authorValinejad, Jaberen_US
dc.contributor.authorBarforoshi, Taghien_US
dc.contributor.authorMarzband, Mousaen_US
dc.contributor.authorPouresmaeil, Edrisen_US
dc.contributor.authorGodina, Raduen_US
dc.contributor.authorCatalão, João P.S.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Electrical Engineering and Automationen
dc.contributor.groupauthorRenewable Energies for Power Systemsen
dc.contributor.organizationVirginia Techen_US
dc.contributor.organizationBabol Noshirvani University of Technologyen_US
dc.contributor.organizationNorthumbria Universityen_US
dc.contributor.organizationUniversity of Beira Interioren_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-02T08:44:43Z
dc.date.available2018-11-02T08:44:43Z
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents the analysis of a novel framework of study and the impact of different market design criterion for the generation expansion planning (GEP) in competitive electricity market incentives, under variable uncertainties in a single year horizon. As investment incentives conventionally consist of firm contracts and capacity payments, in this study, the electricity generation investment problem is considered from a strategic generation company (GENCO) ′ s perspective, modelled as a bi-level optimization method. The first-level includes decision steps related to investment incentives to maximize the total profit in the planning horizon. The second-level includes optimization steps focusing on maximizing social welfare when the electricity market is regulated for the current horizon. In addition, variable uncertainties, on offering and investment, are modelled using set of different scenarios. The bi-level optimization problem is then converted to a single-level problem and then represented as a mixed integer linear program (MILP) after linearization. The efficiency of the proposed framework is assessed on the MAZANDARAN regional electric company (MREC) transmission network, integral to IRAN interconnected power system for both elastic and inelastic demands. Simulations show the significance of optimizing the firm contract and the capacity payment that encourages the generation investment for peak technology and improves long-term stability of electricity markets.en
dc.description.versionPeer revieweden
dc.format.extent23
dc.format.extent1978-2000
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.citationValinejad, J, Barforoshi, T, Marzband, M, Pouresmaeil, E, Godina, R & Catalão, J P S 2018, ' Investment Incentives in Competitive Electricity Markets ', Applied Sciences (Switzerland), vol. 8, no. 10, pp. 1978-2000 . https://doi.org/10.3390/app8101978en
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/app8101978en_US
dc.identifier.issn2076-3417
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: b0e90ee9-40d4-4c35-b70b-9a28c3e55721en_US
dc.identifier.otherPURE ITEMURL: https://research.aalto.fi/en/publications/b0e90ee9-40d4-4c35-b70b-9a28c3e55721en_US
dc.identifier.otherPURE FILEURL: https://research.aalto.fi/files/29031968/ELEC_Valinejad_etal_Investment_Incentives_ApplSci_8_10_1978_2018.pdfen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/34532
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:fi:aalto-201811025585
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesApplied Sciences (Switzerland)en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolume 8, issue 10en
dc.rightsopenAccessen
dc.subject.keywordcapasity paymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordfirm contracten_US
dc.subject.keywordgeneration expansion planningen_US
dc.subject.keywordmathematical program with equilibrium constraintsen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic GENCOen_US
dc.subject.keyworduncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordinvestment incentivesen_US
dc.titleInvestment Incentives in Competitive Electricity Marketsen
dc.typeA1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessäfi
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
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