From ideals to deals - The effect of impartiality experience on stakeholder behavior

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A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä

Date

2017-08-01

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en

Pages

16

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PLOS ONE, Volume 12, issue 8

Abstract

In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeholders’ private endowments. Both the two stakeholders and third-party arbitrators may influence the outcome. We consider Nash-demand negotiations, where the two stakeholders place demands and share the pie accordingly if demands are compatible, and elicit dictatorial allocations from the stakeholders and the arbitrators. The Nash demands by stakeholders are strategic; the dictatorial allocations by stakeholders and arbitrators are non-strategic. We are interested in the influence of the past arbitrator experience on stakeholder allocations and demands and the past stakeholder experience on third-party arbitration allocations. We find that the ex-arbitrators’ stakeholder allocations differ more from the impartial ideal than the stakeholder allocations by those without arbitration experience. In contrast with previous findings, the arbitration outcomes do not depend on the asymmetries in the previous stakeholder roles.

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Halko , M L & Miettinen , T 2017 , ' From ideals to deals - The effect of impartiality experience on stakeholder behavior ' , PloS one , vol. 12 , no. 8 . https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182263