Performance, Risk and Incentives of U.S. and Offshore Hedge Funds

Abstract

In this paper I examine the relationship between U.S. and Offshore hedge funds’ performance, risk, and managerial incentives in the presence of 5 unique hedge fund features and 7 hedge fund investment strategies. I find evidence suggesting that on average, hedge funds are not able to beat the market in terms of risk-adjusted returns but show higher risk-adjusted returns and volatility over mutual funds. I find some positive relationships between certain hedge fund features and performance but reveal no clear evidence of hedge fund strategies having a significant effect on hedge funds’ risk-adjusted performance. I find evidence suggesting that hedge fund managers are incentivized to enhance their risk taking to achieve superior returns in the presence of performance-based compensation schemes. Finally, I investigate 2 data-conditioning biases and find that these biases can cause hedge funds’ performance to be overstated.