Signaling and countersignaling

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dc.contributor Aalto University en
dc.contributor Aalto-yliopisto fi
dc.contributor.advisor Mustonen, Mikko
dc.contributor.author Häkkinen, Aaro
dc.date.accessioned 2019-04-21T16:01:35Z
dc.date.available 2019-04-21T16:01:35Z
dc.date.issued 2018
dc.identifier.uri https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/37519
dc.description.abstract Signaling is relevant for markets and games with incomplete information, and it occurs when a player believes he can improve his payoff by a decision to signal. In order to study signaling games, it is meaningful to seek possible equilibria. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a solution concept that can be used for this. Related to strategies of players, countersignaling is a phenomenon in which a player of higher quality invests less in signals than a player of lower quality. This kind of equilibrium requires an existence of additional noisy information that can change the interpretation of signals. en
dc.format.extent 12
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.title Signaling and countersignaling en
dc.type G1 Kandidaatintyö fi
dc.contributor.school Kauppakorkeakoulu fi
dc.contributor.school School of Business en
dc.contributor.department Taloustieteen laitos fi
dc.subject.keyword signaling en
dc.subject.keyword countersignaling en
dc.subject.keyword game theory en
dc.subject.keyword perfect Bayesian equilibrium en
dc.identifier.urn URN:NBN:fi:aalto-201904212640
dc.type.ontasot Bachelor's thesis en
dc.type.ontasot Kandidaatintyö fi
dc.programme Taloustiede en


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