Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders

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dc.contributor Aalto-yliopisto fi
dc.contributor Aalto University en
dc.contributor.author Murto, Pauli
dc.contributor.author Välimäki, Juuso
dc.date.accessioned 2018-12-10T10:08:40Z
dc.date.available 2018-12-10T10:08:40Z
dc.date.issued 2017-05-01
dc.identifier.citation Murto , P & Välimäki , J 2017 , ' Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders ' Journal of Economic Theory , vol. 169 , pp. 629-640 . DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008 en
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.identifier.other PURE UUID: 0393f7d3-93d5-4380-bd8b-b30ca041e0de
dc.identifier.other PURE ITEMURL: https://research.aalto.fi/en/publications/large-allpay-auctions-with-ipv-bidders(0393f7d3-93d5-4380-bd8b-b30ca041e0de).html
dc.identifier.other PURE LINK: http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85016391551&partnerID=8YFLogxK
dc.identifier.other PURE FILEURL: https://research.aalto.fi/files/30207557/LargeAPA.pdf
dc.identifier.uri https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/34896
dc.description.abstract This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5% of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. en
dc.format.extent 12
dc.format.extent 629-640
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Journal of Economic Theory en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Volume 169 en
dc.rights openAccess en
dc.subject.other Economics and Econometrics en
dc.subject.other 511 Economics en
dc.title Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders en
dc.type A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä fi
dc.description.version Peer reviewed en
dc.contributor.department Department of Economics
dc.subject.keyword All-pay auction
dc.subject.keyword Large auctions
dc.subject.keyword Economics and Econometrics
dc.subject.keyword 511 Economics
dc.identifier.urn URN:NBN:fi:aalto-201812105911
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008
dc.date.embargo info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2019-03-31


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