Use of Auctions in Spectrum Awards

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dc.contributor Aalto-yliopisto fi
dc.contributor Aalto University en
dc.contributor.author Jääskeläinen, Jan
dc.date.accessioned 2017-06-15T07:44:05Z
dc.date.available 2017-06-15T07:44:05Z
dc.date.issued 2016
dc.identifier.uri https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/26867
dc.description.abstract In my thesis I explore how to best award spectrum licenses to mobile network operators. During the last twenty years governments have shifted their preferred method of awarding spectrum from comparative awards to auctions. The praised VCG mechanism does not apply well to auctioning spectrum and instead simultaneous multiple round auction, clock auction, and combinatorial clock auction models are used. These models have flaws causing bidders to lack an unambiguous dominant strategy and practice demand reduction. Each spectrum auction is different and there exists no one-size-fits-all solution. Thus, the auction design process carries tremendous weight when attempting to organize a successful spectrum award. en
dc.format.extent 68
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.title Use of Auctions in Spectrum Awards en
dc.type G2 Pro gradu, diplomityö fi
dc.contributor.school Kauppakorkeakoulu fi
dc.contributor.school School of Business en
dc.contributor.department Taloustieteen laitos fi
dc.contributor.department Department of Economics en
dc.subject.keyword spectrum awards
dc.subject.keyword spectrum auctions
dc.subject.keyword mechanism design
dc.subject.keyword VCG mechanism
dc.subject.keyword multi-unit auction
dc.subject.keyword simultaneous ascending auction
dc.subject.keyword combinatorial clock auction
dc.identifier.urn URN:NBN:fi:aalto-201801181130
dc.type.dcmitype text en
dc.programme.major Kansantaloustiede fi
dc.programme.major Economics en
dc.type.ontasot Pro gradu tutkielma fi
dc.type.ontasot Master's thesis en
dc.subject.helecon taloustieteet
dc.subject.helecon mobiilitekniikka
dc.subject.helecon teleoperaattorit
dc.subject.helecon kilpailu
dc.subject.helecon huutokaupat
dc.ethesisid 14772
dc.date.dateaccepted 2016-05-16
dc.location P1 I


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