Agency conflicts and company valuation: A study on dual-class shares, supervisory boards, staggered boards and board independency

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dc.contributor Aalto-yliopisto fi
dc.contributor Aalto University en
dc.contributor.author Tervo, Markku
dc.date.accessioned 2014-08-06T08:38:21Z
dc.date.available 2014-08-06T08:38:21Z
dc.date.issued 2014
dc.identifier.uri https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/13692
dc.description.abstract This thesis examines agency conflicts in companies with the focus on majority-minority shareholder conflicts and conflicts between the management and shareholders. These agency conflicts are addressed by studying the impact of dual-class shares, supervisory boards, staggered boards and board independency on company valuation of the Finnish and Swedish stock-listed companies at the end of the year 2013. The valuation impact of each mechanism is tested with a separate regression models where Tobin's Q is regressed on dummies for the respective mechanism and a set of control variables. Furthermore, an additional event study on the Finnish supervisory board abolitions is performed. The descriptive statistics show that dual-class shares are still common in Finland and especially in Sweden. On the contrary, the other three mechanisms are rare and mainly concentrated on certain industries in Finland. Moreover, the four mechanisms appear to serve as complements rather than substitutes to each other. The regression models yield negative coefficients for dual-class share and staggered board dummies. The staggered board dummy is statistically significant, while the dummy for dual-class shares is at the most suggestive. The event study on supervisory board abolitions fails to document any statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns around the event date. Unexpectedly, the cumulative abnormal returns are lower for state-owned companies that dismantle their supervisory board than for their privately owned counterparts. The possible endogeneity problems, small sample sizes and low number other mechanisms than dual-class shares impose certain methodological challenges. Therefore, the robustness of the results and the direction of causality cannot be fully ensured. en
dc.format.extent 58
dc.language.iso en en
dc.title Agency conflicts and company valuation: A study on dual-class shares, supervisory boards, staggered boards and board independency en
dc.type G2 Pro gradu, diplomityö fi
dc.contributor.school Kauppakorkeakoulu fi
dc.contributor.school School of Business en
dc.contributor.department Rahoituksen laitos fi
dc.contributor.department Department of Finance en
dc.subject.keyword corporate governance
dc.subject.keyword dual-class shares
dc.subject.keyword supervisory board
dc.subject.keyword staggered board
dc.subject.keyword board independency
dc.identifier.urn URN:NBN:fi:aalto-201408062356
dc.type.dcmitype text en
dc.programme.major Finance en
dc.programme.major Rahoitus fi
dc.type.ontasot Master's thesis en
dc.type.ontasot Pro gradu tutkielma fi
dc.subject.helecon rahoitus
dc.subject.helecon financing
dc.subject.helecon agentit
dc.subject.helecon agents
dc.subject.helecon konflikti
dc.subject.helecon conflicts
dc.subject.helecon hallitukset
dc.subject.helecon boards of directors
dc.subject.helecon osakkeet
dc.subject.helecon shares
dc.ethesisid 13651
dc.date.dateaccepted 2014-07-02
dc.location P1 I fi


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